Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Petitioner challenged the OCC and the Board's authority to issue cease-and-desist orders pursuant to Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C. 1829, as well as their respective conclusions that petitioner's agreement with the prosecutor triggered Section 19. Section 19 restricted who could participate in the affairs of insured depository institutions and bank and savings and loan holding companies. Because the agencies applied an improper definition of "pretrial diversion or similar program" and failed to adequately justify their positions on petitioner's expunction, the court granted petitioner's petitions for review in part, vacated the agencies' orders, and remanded for the agencies to determine whether the Agreement at issue fell within the parameters the court identified. The court denied the petition in all other respects. View "DeNaples v. Office of the Comptroller of Currency" on Justia Law

Mortgagors appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims against the FHLMC and other financial institutions, a law firm, and others. Mortgagors asserted twenty-one claims under Minnesota law related to defendants' rights to the mortgages on the mortgagors' homes. The court rejected the mortgagors' argument that the district court improperly dismissed their claims against the law firm and their contention that their complaint made out a Minnesota slander-of-title action. The court also concluded that the mortgagors did not make out a quiet title claim and the district court properly dismissed their claims against the financial institutions. View "Peterson, et al v. CitiMortgage, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Mortgagors filed suit in Minnesota state court against defendants, alleging numerous deficiencies in the assignment of their mortgages and in their foreclosures. In this appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred in denying their motion to remand when it concluded that they failed to make out claims for slander of title, declaratory judgment, and quiet title, and in mistakenly relying on Jackson v. Mortgage Registration Sys. Because the court recently concluded that nearly identical claims against a resident law firm had no reasonable basis in law and fact under Minnesota law and constituted fraudulent joinder, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred by dismissing the claims against the law firm and denying remand; the court disposed of the slander-of-title claim because the court recently upheld the dismissal of a virtually identical claim in Butler v. Bank of America; the court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment to determine whether defendants had "any true interest in or right to foreclose on their properties" and whether the notes were properly accelerated by the correct party; and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the quiet title action. View "Karnatcheva, et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose from a land development project dispute where the Retreat took out a short-term purchase loan from a Georgia bank to finance the acquisition of the land. At issue was the district court's interpretation of an exclusion in a title insurance policy issued by First American to the bank and the district court's decision that First American was entitled to summary judgment based on that exclusion. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted the terms of the title insurance contract; the district court's conclusion that the affidavit at issue would be admissible at trial was not an abuse of discretion; and the evidence demonstrated that the bank was fully aware of the Retreat property's lack of dedicated access when it extended the purchase loan and took out the insurance policy from First American. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and because First American was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment was appropriate. View "Cynergy, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from defendant's arrest for bank fraud. The government appealed the district court's denial of its motion in limine to admit a state court temporary restraining order as evidence against defendant. The court held that, because the government was seeking to admit the state court order for a non-hearsay purpose and because the district court's analysis pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 did not account for the order's probative value if offered to show knowledge, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dupree" on Justia Law

Porayko entered bankruptcy in 2009, having $10,000 in a checking account at TCF. Crowell, holding a $73,000 judgment against Porayko, served Porayko with a citation to discover assets, asserting a lien. 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(m). Crane, the bankruptcy trustee, argued that only a citation served directly on the bank would establish a lien. The bankruptcy judge lifted the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(d). The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute provides that a citation to discover assets creates a lien on all “nonexempt personal property, including money, choses in action, and effects of the judgment debtor,” including “all personal property belonging to the judgment debtor in the possession or control of the judgment debtor or which may thereafter be acquired or come due to the judgment debtor.” A bank account may be an intangible interest, but intangible rights are personal property and a checking account’s holder controls the right to designate who receives the funds on deposit, which makes its value a form of “personal property” under Illinois law. View "Crane v. Crowell" on Justia Law

In 1986, appellee personally guaranteed a loan made by Petra to AEGIS. Appellee subsequently sued Petra in district court in late 2008, seeking a declaratory judgment that he did not have any obligations under a Guaranty Agreement. Petra counter-sued in early 2009, seeking to enforce the Guaranty Agreement. The court concluded that Petra's claim was time-barred where the limitations period began in 1987 when AEGIS declared bankruptcy and appellee was obligated to pay Petra under the Guaranty Agreement, and the limitations period expired in 1999. The court also concluded that Petra should have the opportunity to produce evidence sufficient to create a substantial question of material fact to the governing issues of the case. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Farouki v. Petra Int'l. Banking Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Selma Development, LLC (Selma) obtained a loan from TierOne Bank (TierOne) that was guaranteed with six individual guaranty agreements. Selma later defaulted on the note. The property was sold at a trustee's sale, but the sale price was insufficient to cover the debt. TierOne brought an action seeking payment from the guarantors (Defendants). After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the fair market value of the property greatly exceeded the amount received from the trustee's sale. The court then granted TierOne's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against Selma for $306,230 and against Defendants for $586,229. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment remanded, holding (1) once the trial court determined that the fair market value of the property was greater than the amount received at the trustee's sale, it had to determine whether the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act applied to the guarantors, and accordingly, its order determining fair market value was not a final order; and (2) Defendants offered evidence which created a genuine issue of material fact regarding their defenses, precluding summary judgment. View "Selma Dev., LLC v. Great W. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo for fraudulent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel after Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure when plaintiffs stopped paying on their mortgage loan. The court held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the modification of their home loan and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The court also held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for promissory estoppel and the district court did not err in dismissing their claim. View "Freitas, et al v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Eleven plaintiffs who obtained home loans from Countrywide Bank, sought to challenge alleged racial disparities dating back to 2002 and resulting from Countrywide’s loan-pricing policy for home mortgages. The district court denied class certification, finding that the proposed class failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s commonality requirement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs challenged policies that grant broad discretion to local agents; they do not claim that a uniform policy or practice guides how local actors exercise their discretion, such that the corporate guidance caused or contributed to the alleged disparate impacts. To justify certification, class members must unite acts of discretion under a single policy or practice, or through a single mode of exercising discretion; the mere presence of a range within which acts of discretion take place will not suffice to establish commonality. View "Miller v. Countrywide Fin. Corp." on Justia Law