Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Bank sued five guarantors (Guarantors) following defaults on the underlying notes. During discovery, Bank tendered requests for admissions to each of Guarantors, including a request to admit the specific amount due on the note for principal, accrued interest, and a prepayment fee. Ultimately, the district court (1) entered judgment in favor of the Bank with respect to the principal and accrued interest due from Guarantors, but (2) based in part on Guarantors' answers to the requests for admissions, determined Bank was not entitled to prepayment fees. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings in each case on the prepayment fee issue, holding that the district court erred when it treated the Guarantors' answers to Bank's requests for admissions as denials rather than admissions that Guarantors owed prepayment fees. Remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

MTA, Inc. appealed a circuit court order which held that its claims against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. were subject to an arbitration agreement and compelling MTA to arbitrate those claims. MTA entered into a deferred compensation agreement ("the DCA") with its employee, Yvonne Sanders. Pursuant to the terms of the DCA, MTA was obligated to pay Yvonne $270,000 in 120 equal monthly installments beginning the month following her 50th birthday or, in the event Yvonne died before reaching her 50th birthday, to pay her children, Tiffany Sanders and Roderick Dedrick, a total of $750,000 in 120 equal monthly installments beginning the month after her death. MTA thereafter obtained a $1,000,000 life insurance policy on Yvonne to fund the death benefit provided in the DCA in the event it became payable. On October 22, 1999, Yvonne died at the age of 43. MTA thereafter received the $1,000,000 it was owed under the life-insurance policy. However, MTA did not begin making payments to Tiffany and Roderick as called for by the DCA. Instead, Tiffany and Robert asked MTA to establish a rabbi trust to handle the payments, presumably to allow for more favorable tax treatment for Tiffany and Roderick. MTA executed a trust agreement with Thomas W. Dedrick, Sr., Tiffany and Roderick's uncle and a licensed broker employed by Merrill Lynch, establishing the trust and depositing into it an initial sum of $506,450. The trust agreement also provided that Thomas would act as trustee of the trust. Subsequent to the creation of the trust some intermittent payments were made from the trust to Tiffany and Roderick before payments ceased in late 2009. The sum total of the payments made did not equal $750,000. In 2011, Tiffany and Roderick filed an action against MTA asserting breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims and seeking $213,777, the amount they allege was still due them pursuant to the DCA. Merrill Lynch moved to compel arbitration of MTA's claims against it pursuant to the arbitration provisions in the account-authorization form. MTA opposed that motion, arguing that it was not a party to those contracts, and, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Merrill Lynch's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed MTA's third-party claims against Merrill Lynch. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed that order, holding that MTA was not a signatory to those contracts and that the scope of the arbitration provisions in those contracts was too narrow to encompass disputes between Merrill Lynch and other entities not a party to those contracts. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MTA, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Nevada homeowner, elected mediation pursuant to the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) to produce a loan modification. When the mediation did not result in a loan modification, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review asking for sanctions against Respondent, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC), alleging that BAC failed to comply with the FMP's document production and good faith requirements. The district court rejected Appellant's petition, finding (1) there was no irregularity as to the submitted documents; (2) BAC met its burden of showing a lack of bad faith; and (3) absent a timely appeal, a letter of certification would issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although BAC's document production lacked a key assignment, Appellant filled the gap with a document he produced; and (2) the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions and allowing the FMP certificate to issue. View "Einhorn v. BAC Homes Loans Servicing" on Justia Law

Southwest sells title reports to consumer lenders, containing information available in public records. Southwest’s reports include the owner’s name and address, marital status, and amounts of outstanding mortgages, liens or judgments against the property. Reports do not include social security numbers, payment history, previous addresses, employment information, birthdate, or outstanding account balances, as would typically appear in a credit report prepared by credit reporting agencies. Unlike a credit reporting company, Southwest endeavors to include only unsatisfied liens encumbering the property. Fuges had a $35,000 line of credit from PNC, secured by her home. In 2008, she applied for payment protection insurance; PNC ordered a credit report from a credit reporting agency and a property report from Southwest, which was arguably inaccurate concerning tax delinquency and a judgment lien. PNC initially denied her application, but later granted her request. Fuges filed a putative class action against Southwest, alleging violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681-1681x. The district court dismissed many claims because she had not taken actions required by FCRA, then entered summary judgment for Southwest, reasoning that no reasonable jury could find willful violation of FCRA, because Southwest reasonably interpreted the statute as inapplicable. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Fuges v. SW Fin. Serv., Ltd." on Justia Law

This was a preference action under 11 U.S.C. 547 by the Chapter 7 trustee to recover a payoff payment to Border State Bank from proceeds of debtor's liquidation sale. The bankruptcy court denied the Bank's motion for summary judgment, holding that the perfection of the Bank's lien was within the perfection period under section 547(b) and that the floating lien defense in section 547(c)(5) did not provide a defense to a security interest that was actually perfected during the preference period. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held that the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that section 547(c)(5) did not apply and in thus ruling in favor of the trustee on the Bank's motion for summary judgment; the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that liquidation as part of the cessation of debtor's business was not ordinary course; and the bankruptcy court did not err in rejecting the Bank's new value defense. The court also held that payment to the bank of funds which were held in debtor's account at the Bank at the start of the liquidation period was not a preferential transfer or an improper setoff. However, the Bank should be required to pay for the services it hired to analyze its own best strategy and the court committed clear error in giving it credit for that expenditure. View "Velde v. Border State Bank" on Justia Law

Shirley Krzycki was the sole settlor, trustee, and beneficiary of the Shirley Krzycki Trust established to hold annual payments from an insurance settlement. Upon Shirley's death, Shirley's son Greg was named successor trustee of the Trust. Greg filed suit, claiming that sums on deposit in a bank account, formerly owned by Shirley as "primary joint owner," were property of the Trust. Shirley's daughter Robin was originally named "secondary joint owner" on this account, and Robin refused to give to the Trust the sums on deposit in this account. After a bench trial, the district court held that the balance of the Wells Fargo account belonged to the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, but for reasons different from those of the district court, holding (1) the remaining sums on deposit in the bank account for the benefit of the Trust were trust funds belonging to the Trust; and (2) Robin converted the funds in the account for her own use by refusing to turn them over to the Trust. View "Krzycki v. Krzycki" on Justia Law

Beneva and Iberiabank became parties to the sublease at issue through a series of assignments. At issue was whether the sublease transferred by the FDIC to Iberiabank after it took over the assets of a failed bank was enforceable despite a clause purporting to terminate the sublease on sale or transfer of the failed bank. Because the court found that the FDIC acted within its power to enforce contracts under 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(13)(A) and that the termination clause was unenforceable against Iberiabank as the FDIC's transferee, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberiabank. View "Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Coyers entered into a mortgage agreement with Option One to purchase property in Linwood, Michigan. Subsequently, HSBC purchased the mortgage. After the Coyers allegedly stopped making payment to HSBC in 2010, HSBC began foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the mortgage contract’s “power of sale” clause. The Coyers filed a complaint asserting numerous allegations concerning alleged illegal conduct routinely practiced in the mortgage industry. They claimed: breach of fiduciary duty; negligence; common law fraud; breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of HSBC. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Coyer v. HSBC Mortg. Servs/, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between decisions of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and the Second District Court of Appeals concerning the effect of an individual retirement account custodian's filing of an interpleader action against competing claimants. The Court held that when the custodian of an individual retirement account filed an interpleader action against the parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, the custodian waives its contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and a person who proves that the owner of the account clearly intended to designate him or her as the beneficiary does not also need to prove that the owner substantially complied with the change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover. Instead, the account owner's clearly expressed intent controls. Because this holding rejected the analysis adopted by the Second District Court of Appeals in this case and because there existed a genuine issue of fact as to the intent of the account owner, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded to the common pleas court for trial. View "LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law