Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Javell, the owner of a mortgage brokerage, and Arroyo, Javell’s employee and loan processor, were convicted of two counts of mortgage-based wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) based on their actions in procuring a fraudulent mortgage during an FBI sting operation. Javell was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Javell argued the district court violated Bruton, and Javell’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the post-arrest statements made by Arroyo and by failing to properly instruct the jury about the rules of non-imputation. According to Javell, Arroyo’s post-arrest statements directly implicated Javell and had the jury not heard those statements, Javell would not have been convicted. Noting a “plethora” of other evidence, including recordings, the court rejected the argument. View "United States v. Javell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this suit in Minnesota state court challenging the foreclosure of the mortgage of their home. The Bank defendants removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), as did the PFB defendants. The district court granted the motions to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that the lack of any factual allegations regarding PFB rendered plaintiffs' complaint deficient and the district court did not err in dismissing it for failure to state a claim. The court also held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the Bank, finding no merit in plaintiffs' claims. View "Butler, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

The target witness learned in 2009 that the IRS had opened a file on him, and that an IRS special agent and DOJ tax division prosecutor were assigned to investigate whether he used secret offshore bank accounts to evade income taxes. Two years later, a grand jury issued a subpoena requiring that he produce all records required to be maintained pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 1010.420 relating to foreign financial accounts that he had a financial interest in, or signature authority over. The requested records are required under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The Government argued that the Required Records Doctrine overrides the Fifth Amendment privilege. The district court quashed the subpoena, concluding that the required records doctrine did not apply because the act of producing the required records was testimonial and would compel the witness to incriminate himself. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the Doctrine applicable. View "In re: February 2011-1 Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

The procedural background of the extensive litigation underlying this case was discussed in Madsen IV. Following the Supreme Court's decision in that case, Appellant Nancy Madsen filed a new complaint alleging grounds for the same relief that was sought by the earlier complaint. The new complaint was dismissed as barred by res judicata, and this appeal followed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the litigation preceding the filing of Appellant's new action definitively resolved her claims and erected a res judicata bar to any subsequent complaint raising claims that could have and should have been raised in that litigation. View "Madsen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This case involved unanswered questions of Georgia law that are central to this appeal. Because these questions are determinative of the case and there are no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court respectfully certified the following questions for resolution: (1) Whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33, such that a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser would have constructive notice when the deed incorporates the covenants, terms, and provisions of a rider that contains the attestations required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33 and said rider was filed, recorded, and indexed with the security deed; and (2) If the answer to question one was in the negative, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. View "Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Vanderbilt sued to foreclose against appellees for defaulting on their installment payments on a mobile home and appellees responded by claiming that they had been released from any underlying debt on the retail installment contract. Intervenors claimed that Vanderbilt, CMH, and their parent company CHI, had filed false liens on their land as collateral for appellees' retail installment contract. The court affirmed the judgment and award of damages with respect to intervenors' claims. The court reversed and remanded the judgment as to Vanderbilt's claims against appellees, as well as appellees' counterclaims. View "Vanderbilt Mtge. and Fin. Inc. v. Flores, et al." on Justia Law

Missouri Bank sued OneBeacon for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The court held that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for Missouri Bank on its breach-of-contract claim and rejected OneBeacon's claim that it did not breach Insuring Agreement (D) by denying Missouri Bank's claim because Insuring Agreement (D) did not cover losses resulting from fraudulent faxes. The court also held that the district court's finding that OneBeacon had reasonable cause to deny Missouri Bank's vexatious refusal to pay claim was not clearly erroneous. View "Missouri Bank and Trust Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Raynor sued National Rural, a number of its officers, and alleged co-conspirators in a qui tam action for violations of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-33. Raynor alleged that National Rural was violating the FCA by receiving Farmer Mac investment funds in violation of federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice as to Raynor and he appealed. The court held that Raynor's complaint did not meet the standard of particularity required to survive the motion to dismiss and the district court properly dismissed the complaint under Rule 9(b). Even accepting Raynor's facts as true and construing all reasonable inferences most favorably to him, the complaint failed to allege the falsity of each claim. The district court properly dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raynor's request to amend his dismissed complaint a fourth time or in denying his motion to reconsider that dismissal. View "USA, ex rel. John Raynor v. National Rural Utilities Co Op, et al." on Justia Law

Since at least 1995, Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. (plaintiff) has used the mark “COMMUNITY TRUST” to promote its services; it included this mark on its website since 1998. Defendants, Community Trust Financial Corporation, and two subsidiaries, Community Trust Bank and Community Trust Bank of Texas, use the marks “COMMUNITY TRUST” and “COMMUNITY TRUST BANK,” and display these marks on their website. Defendants’ contacts with Kentucky are limited. They have branch offices exclusively in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi and limit their advertising and marketing campaigns to those states; they have no officers, directors, employees, agents, or any other physical presence in Kentucky. They do have customers who moved to Kentucky and continue to maintain their bank accounts from there. Three or four account owners, while residing in Kentucky, requested passwords to access the Defendants’ online banking website. Plaintiff brought a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1), and state law. The district court denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the cause of action only tangentially related to defendants’ acts, providing passwords, within the forum state. View "Cmty. Trust Bancorp, Inc. v. Cmty Trust Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that the Hungarian National Bank and Hungarian National Railway participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Railway plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), and assert: takings in violation of international law, aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide, violations of customary international law, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and accounting. Bank plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA expropriation and waiver exceptions, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and assert: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. They sought certifications as class actions, seeking to have the railway held responsible for approximately $1.25 billion, and the bank held jointly and severally responsible with private banks for approximately $75 billion. The district court declined to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs either exhaust available Hungarian remedies identified by defendants or present a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court should allow jurisdictional discovery with respect to whether the railway is engaged in “commercial activity” in the U.S. View "Abelsz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law