Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Vanderbilt sued to foreclose against appellees for defaulting on their installment payments on a mobile home and appellees responded by claiming that they had been released from any underlying debt on the retail installment contract. Intervenors claimed that Vanderbilt, CMH, and their parent company CHI, had filed false liens on their land as collateral for appellees' retail installment contract. The court affirmed the judgment and award of damages with respect to intervenors' claims. The court reversed and remanded the judgment as to Vanderbilt's claims against appellees, as well as appellees' counterclaims. View "Vanderbilt Mtge. and Fin. Inc. v. Flores, et al." on Justia Law

Missouri Bank sued OneBeacon for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The court held that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for Missouri Bank on its breach-of-contract claim and rejected OneBeacon's claim that it did not breach Insuring Agreement (D) by denying Missouri Bank's claim because Insuring Agreement (D) did not cover losses resulting from fraudulent faxes. The court also held that the district court's finding that OneBeacon had reasonable cause to deny Missouri Bank's vexatious refusal to pay claim was not clearly erroneous. View "Missouri Bank and Trust Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Raynor sued National Rural, a number of its officers, and alleged co-conspirators in a qui tam action for violations of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-33. Raynor alleged that National Rural was violating the FCA by receiving Farmer Mac investment funds in violation of federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice as to Raynor and he appealed. The court held that Raynor's complaint did not meet the standard of particularity required to survive the motion to dismiss and the district court properly dismissed the complaint under Rule 9(b). Even accepting Raynor's facts as true and construing all reasonable inferences most favorably to him, the complaint failed to allege the falsity of each claim. The district court properly dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raynor's request to amend his dismissed complaint a fourth time or in denying his motion to reconsider that dismissal. View "USA, ex rel. John Raynor v. National Rural Utilities Co Op, et al." on Justia Law

Since at least 1995, Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. (plaintiff) has used the mark “COMMUNITY TRUST” to promote its services; it included this mark on its website since 1998. Defendants, Community Trust Financial Corporation, and two subsidiaries, Community Trust Bank and Community Trust Bank of Texas, use the marks “COMMUNITY TRUST” and “COMMUNITY TRUST BANK,” and display these marks on their website. Defendants’ contacts with Kentucky are limited. They have branch offices exclusively in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi and limit their advertising and marketing campaigns to those states; they have no officers, directors, employees, agents, or any other physical presence in Kentucky. They do have customers who moved to Kentucky and continue to maintain their bank accounts from there. Three or four account owners, while residing in Kentucky, requested passwords to access the Defendants’ online banking website. Plaintiff brought a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1), and state law. The district court denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the cause of action only tangentially related to defendants’ acts, providing passwords, within the forum state. View "Cmty. Trust Bancorp, Inc. v. Cmty Trust Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that the Hungarian National Bank and Hungarian National Railway participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Railway plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), and assert: takings in violation of international law, aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide, violations of customary international law, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and accounting. Bank plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA expropriation and waiver exceptions, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and assert: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. They sought certifications as class actions, seeking to have the railway held responsible for approximately $1.25 billion, and the bank held jointly and severally responsible with private banks for approximately $75 billion. The district court declined to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs either exhaust available Hungarian remedies identified by defendants or present a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court should allow jurisdictional discovery with respect to whether the railway is engaged in “commercial activity” in the U.S. View "Abelsz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that defendant banks participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330(a), the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.1350, and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they alleged: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. Plaintiffs sought certification as a class action and asked that each bank be held jointly and severally responsible for damages of approximately $75 billion. This case and a parallel case against the Hungarian national railway have produced nine appeals and mandamus petitions. The district court declined to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, noting that such a decision would ordinarily not be reviewable, stated that: “This is the rare case, however, in which it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of mandamus to confine the district court to the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction” The court cited the extraordinary scale of the litigation, the inherent involvement with U.S. foreign policy, and the “crystal clarity” of the lack of foundation for exercising general personal jurisdiction over the banks. View "Abelesz v. OTP Bank" on Justia Law

Central Mortgage and Morgan Stanley entered into a contract concerning the purchase of servicing rights for loans that Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the agencies) and private investors. Subsequently, many of the loans for which Morgan Stanley sold the servicing rights began to fall delinquent. The agencies exercised their contract right to put delinquent agency loans back to Central Mortgage. Central Mortgage then filed a complaint against Morgan Stanley for breach of contract. The Chancery Court granted Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claims were legally sufficient to withstand the motion. Central Mortgage then filed an amended complaint to add new claims for additional agency loans (new loans) that had been put back by the agencies and to challenge the private loans. Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The Chancery Court (1) denied the motion to dismiss to the extent that it rehashed theories that the Court and Supreme Court already considered in the context of its original motion to dismiss; but (2) granted the motion to dismiss the claims related to the new loans because those claims were barred by Delaware's statute of limitations. View "Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, the General Assembly enacted a statute to require that a foreclosing lender provide advance written notice to the borrower of its intention to foreclosure. Among the information to be provided in that notice is the identity of the "secured party," although the statute does not specifically define that phrase. In this case, there was more than one entity that qualified as a "secured party" under the commonly understood meaning of the phrase. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, in such a situation, a foreclosing party was obligated to identify all secured parties in the advance written notice to the borrower. The Court held (1) a foreclosing party should ordinarily identify, in the notice of intent to foreclose, each entity that is a "secured party" with respect to the deed of trust in question; (2) however, a failure to disclose every secured party is not a basis for dismissing a foreclosure action when certain conditions are met; and (3) under the circumstances of the instant case, because many of the enumerated conditions were met even though the notice failed to disclose every secured party, the dismissal of the foreclosure action was not required. View "Shepherd v. Burson" on Justia Law

Tenant rented her residence from Landlord, who defaulted on the mortgage on that property. U.S. Bank National Association (USBNA), as trustee for a mortgage-backed security that owned that debt, foreclosed on Landlord's deed of trust and terminated Tenant's lease. In doing so, it sent conflicting notices to Tenant about her right under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA) to remain on the property temporarily and filed a premature motion for immediate possession of the property. The circuit court granted USBNA's motion for possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) misleading and contradictory notices concerning a tenant's right to remain in a residence temporarily are ineffective to satisfy the purchaser's obligation under the PTFA; and (2) a motion for possession is premature when it is filed prior to the expiration of the period that the PTFA permits a bona fide tenant to remain in a residential property subject to foreclosure. Remanded. View "Curtis v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Republic of Argentina appealed from an order of the district court granting NML Capital's motion to compel non-parties Bank of America and Banco de la Nacion Argentina to comply with subpoenas duces tecum and denying Argentina's motion to quash the subpoena issued to Bank of America. Argentina argued that the banks' compliance with the subpoenas would infringe on its sovereign immunity. The court concluded, however, that because the district court ordered only discovery, not the attachment of sovereign property, and because that discovery was directed at third-party banks, Argentina's sovereign immunity was not affected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law