Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said, "This case lends credence to the old adage that bad things comes in threes." Plaintiff was a cancer survivor who required experimental leukemia treatment. During his treatment, Plaintiff's identity was stolen by a hospital worker. When Plaintiff attempted to remedy the identity theft, the banks and credit rating agencies were allegedly uncooperative and continued to report the fraudulently opened accounts. In the case of Chase Bank (Chase), the thief's address was tagged as Plaintiff's. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase on Plaintiff's false-reporting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the judgment as to Chase's alleged violations of the FCRA, as issues of material fact remained on this issue; (2) reversed the district court's dismissal of similar claims against FIA Card Services on statute of limitations grounds; and (3) affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend to reinstate his claims under California law. View "Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the president and owner of Company. Plaintiff and Company were sued by an employee for sexual harassment, among other claims. Plaintiff retained Law Firm to represent him and Company. The district court entered judgment against Company. The court later granted Company's motion for a new trial, and the parties subsequently settled. Plaintiff was the personal guarantor on the loans and credit lines provided by lenders to Company. After the original jury verdict, banks and lenders refused to continue extending credit to Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff's real estate holdings crumbled, causing Plaintiff to lose dozens of commercial and residential properties. Plainiff then sued the attorney who acted as lead defense counsel and Law Firm (collectively, Appellees), contending that Appellees committed a series of negligent errors during their representation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, holding that Plaintiff failed to show that his loss of net worth was proximately caused by the actions of Appellees. View "Hamilton v. Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, LLP" on Justia Law

Aladdin’s purportedly gross mismanagement allegedly caused plaintiffs to lose their entire $60 million investment in a collateralized debt obligation. A CDO pays investors based on performance of an underlying asset. The CDO at issue was “synthetic” in that its asset was not a traditional asset like a stock or bond, but was a derivative instrument, whose value was determined in reference to still other assets. The derivative instrument was a “credit default swap” between Aladdin CDO and Goldman Sachs based on the debt of approximately 100 corporate entities and sovereign states. The district court held that, because of a contract provision limiting intended third-party beneficiaries to those “specifically provided herein,” plaintiffs could not bring a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim and could not “recast” their claim in tort. The Second Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the parties intended the contract to benefit investors in the CDO directly and create obligations running from Aladdin to the investors; that the relationship between Aladdin and plaintiffs was sufficiently close to create a duty in tort; and that Aladdin acted with gross negligence in managing the investment portfolio, leading to the failure of the investment vehicle and plaintiffs’ losses. View "Bayerische Landesbank, NY v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

Quality owns dozens of restaurants in several states. To refinance its debt, Quality created subsidiaries (plaintiffs-borrowers) and made a deal with Captec Financial and GE Capital for 34 separate loans totaling $49 million, with each loan secured by a restaurant. The parties disagree about the prepayment requirements for 12 of those loans. The borrowers prepaid according to their own interpretation of the prepayment provision and the lender rejected the effort. The district court granted the lender summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded for the district court to consider extrinsic evidence. The court concluded that extrinsic evidence supported the borrowers’ interpretation and awarded prejudgment interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "BKCAP, LLC v. CAPTEC Franchise Trust 2000-1" on Justia Law

After being rejected for a mortgage because Hall had a bankruptcy and their joint income was too low, Phillips and Hall applied with Bowling, a mortgage broker, under the “stated income loan program.” Bowling prepared an application that omitted Hall’s name, attributed their combined income to Phillips, doubled that income, and falsely claimed that Phillips was a manager. Phillips signed the application and employment verification form. Fremont extended credit. They could not make the payments; the lender foreclosed. Bowling repeated this process often. He pleaded guilty to bank fraud and, to lower his sentence, assisted in prosecution of his clients. Phillips and Hall were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1014. The district court prohibited them from eliciting testimony that Bowling assured them that the loan program was lawful and from arguing mistake of fact when in signing the application and employment verification. They argued that they were hindered in showing the lack of intent for a specific-intent crime. The district judge concluded that they sought to argue mistake of law. Jury instructions required acquittal absent a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants knew that the statements were false; genuine mistake of fact would have led to acquittal.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from a policy designed to protect financial institutions from losses caused by dishonest employees. Trying to recover nearly one million dollars stolen by an employee from client brokerage accounts, three financial institutions sued the insurance company that issued the policy. The district court held that the policy covered the losses and granted summary judgment to the financial institutions. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the court's liability judgment and all but one of its damages calculations, holding (1) the stolen money was covered property; (2) the employee's theft caused a direct loss to the bank; (3) the employee committed his dishonest acts with the manifest intent to cause the loss; and (4) the district court's decision to subtract another insurance company's $50,000 pay-out to the banks based on another employee-dishonesty policy from the damages award was error. Remanded. View "First Defiance Fin. Corp. v. Progressive Cas. Ins." on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from a policy designed to protect financial institutions from losses caused by dishonest employees. Trying to recover nearly one million dollars stolen by an employee from client brokerage accounts, three financial institutions sued the insurance company that issued the policy. The district court held that the policy covered the losses and granted summary judgment to the financial institutions. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the court's liability judgment and all but one of its damages calculations, holding (1) the stolen money was covered property; (2) the employee's theft caused a direct loss to the bank; (3) the employee committed his dishonest acts with the manifest intent to cause the loss; and (4) the district court's decision to subtract another insurance company's $50,000 pay-out to the banks based on another employee-dishonesty policy from the damages award was error. Remanded. View "First Defiance Fin. Corp. v. Progressive Cas. Ins." on Justia Law

A bank customer sued her bank to recover for unauthorized withdrawals from her checking account, made using her check card and personal identification number (PIN). Federal law requires a bank to investigate such disputed transactions, to notify the customer if it has verified the transactions as authorized, and to recredit the account if the withdrawals were unauthorized; failure to do so renders the bank liable to the customer for up to treble damages. The bank investigated the withdrawals at issue in this case, found that they were the product of a scheme to defraud the bank, and denied liability for the withdrawals. The customer, represented by counsel, brought suit. By the time the case was tried to the district court, the customer was pro se. After a two-day bench trial, the District Court rejected the customer's EFTA claims and entered judgment for the bank. Specifically, the District Court found that the transactions were authorized because they were part of a scheme to defraud the bank. The customer appealed pro se. Although the briefs were "inartfully" drawn, she challenged the District Court's finding as clearly erroneous. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit found no error and therefore affirmed. View "Merisier v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

David and Glenette Nothum sought a writ prohibiting the circuit court from compelling them to testify in a judgment debtor's examination conducted pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 513.380. The court ordered the Nothums to testify despite their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination and held them in contempt when they refused to do so, finding that the immunity granted to the Nothums pursuant to section 513.380.2 was coextensive with their constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court granted a permanent writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Nothums to testify, as the immunity in this case did not include derivative use immunity and, so, was not coextensive with the Nothums' constitutional privilege. View "State ex rel. Nothum v. Circuit Court (Walsh) " on Justia Law

Plaintiff co-established Company. Plaintiff later sold his majority interest pursuant to an agreement calling for payments to Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff a security interest in Company's assets. Company subsequently applied for credit with Bank, which transaction made Plaintiff's security interest in Company's assets subordinate to Bank's. Thereafter, Company went out of business, leaving loans unpaid. Plaintiff brought claims against Bank for negligence, constructive fraud, actual fraud, and tortious interference with a contract. The trial court granted Bank's motion for judgment on the evidence on all claims, including finding that Bank owed no duty to Purcell. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling as to the issues of duty but reversed the trial court's judgment on the evidence as to Purcell's remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) there was not sufficient evidence presented in this case to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence on Purcell's claims of fraud, deception, and tortious interference with a contract; and (2) Purcell's relationship with Bank as a subordinate creditor did not give rise to a duty of care required to prove Purcell's claims of negligence and constructive fraud. View "Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law