Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

This was an appeal from the denial of declaratory and injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled low-income residents by HUD. The complex was funded by Section 811 of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (Section 811), 42 U.S.C. 8013. Following the district court's grant of summary judgment and denial of injunctive relief against the foreclosure sale, HUD resumed foreclosure proceedings. HUD subsequently sold the property to a third party not before the court. Consequently, the court could not grant NBC effective relief and dismissed the appeal as moot. View "NBC-USA Housing, Inc, et al. v. Donovan, et al." on Justia Law

Judith Kehl and Port of Call, LLC filed a motion to modify an order of prejudgment attachment and attachment on trustee process that had been entered in favor of Centrix Bank and Trust, following a contested hearing, ten months earlier. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits, concluding that the final judgment rule barred the appeal because (1) Appellants' motion raised arguments that should have, and could have, been raised before the attachment order was issued and on direct appeal from that order, and therefore, Appellants waived any rights by failing to challenge the attachment order through proper procedural avenues; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied in this case. View "Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Midland Funding obtained judgments against Plaintiff Susan Ballou in two cases. The small claims court entered installment payment orders pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-356d. Defendant, the Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., which represented Midland in small claims court, did not apply for an order of postjudgment interest in either of the two cases, and the small claims court did not issue an order of postjudgment interest in either case. Defendant thereafter sought a bank execution against Plaintiff for the judgment amounts and directed the state marshal to add postjudgment interest of ten percent to the amount of the judgments. Plaintiff commenced an action in the U.S. district court disputing the amount of the debts. At issue before the court was whether postjudgment interest accrues automatically on any unpaid balance under a judgment for which the court has entered an installment payment order. The Connecticut Supreme Court accepted certification to answer this question and held that section 52-356d(e) does not provide for the automatic accrual of postjudgment interest on all judgments in which an installment payment order has been entered by the court. View "Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C." on Justia Law

In 2002 Bell established mutual funds and raised about $2.5 billion for investment. Most of the firms to which the funds routed money were controlled by Petters. He was running a Ponzi scheme. There was no inventory. New investments paid older debts, with some money siphoned off for personal use. When Petters was caught in 2008, the funds collapsed; about 60% of the money was gone. The funds' bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the funds' auditor, alleging negligence. The district court dismissed without deciding whether the auditor had acted competently, invoking the doctrine of in pari delicto, based on Bell's knowledge of the scheme. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Bell was not stealing funds and that the extent of his knowledge cannot be determined at this stage. An allegation that Bell was negligent but not criminally culpable in 2006 and 2007 makes the claim against the auditor sufficient. View "Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs acquired on the secondary market hundreds of millions of dollars of non-performing bonds issued by the Republic of Argentina. In due course, plaintiffs began to bring suit in the United States courts to collect the debt. In these eleven consolidated appeals, they moved to attach a New York bank account owned by ANPCT. The court held that the district court correctly held that the funds in the ANPCT account were subject to attachment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1610 because they were "used for a commercial activity in the United States." View "NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

A new customer of the bank (Ott) obtained a loan to finance the purchase of a motor home from the dealership that Ott himself owned. Ott presented the certificate of origin and pledged the motor home as collateral. When Ott defaulted two years later, the bank discovered that the certificate of origin was a fake and the motor home did not exist. The bank’s insurer denied recovery because the fake certificate of origin did not meet the insurance bond definition of "Counterfeit." The district court ruled in favor of the insurer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The certificate of origin did not imitate an actual, original certificate of origin for a 2007 motor home because there never was an actual, valid, original certificate for the vehicle pledged as collateral: the manufacturer never produced the vehicle described.View "North Shore Bank, FSB v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant was in the U.S. illegally and, at the direction of another, purchased a house for the purpose of obtaining multiple home equity lines of credit. He submitted loan applications that contained false statements about citizenship, employment, and intent to reside in the house, and concealed other loan applications He pled guilty to engaging in a scheme to defraud financial institutions and to obtain monies and funds owned by and under the custody and control of the financial institutions by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, and omission, 18 U.S.C. 1344. He was sentenced to 51 months and ordered to pay $337,250 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order, rejecting an argument that he could not be ordered to pay restitution for conduct to which he did not plead guilty. The transactions to which he pled guilty resulted in no actual loss because he was arrested before the loans were funded. The court noted that his plea declaration described the scheme as a whole and the ultimate loss to the lender. View "United States v. Dong" on Justia Law

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13. View "Kekauoha-Alisa, et al. v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his civil action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that plaintiff's claim was covered by the FDCPA but that he did not allege acts that violated the FDCPA. Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the statement on the May 2009 notice that BAC was plaintiff's "creditor" was a false representation and was made by a "debt collector" as defined by section 1692a. Therefore, the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under the FDCPA and the judgment of the district court was vacated and remanded. View "Bourff v. Lublin, LLC" on Justia Law