Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Defendant Peter Bernegger and his co-defendant were charged in a six-count indictment with various counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy for inducing investors to invest money in two start-up companies based on several misrepresentations. Bernegger was convicted of mail and bank fraud and was sentenced to seventy months in prison and ordered to pay restitution of approximately $2 million. The Fifth Circuit affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to sever the bank fraud count from the mail and wire fraud counts; (2) the district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment or abuse its discretion in denying Bernegger the opportunity to cross-examine a witness about an alleged discrepancy in Bernegger's testimony; (3) the district court did not plainly err by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte based on the format of the indictment; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict finding Berneggar guilty of mail fraud; and (5) because the district court clearly erred in calculating the total loss amount, the restitution amount was incorrect and was therefore modified to reflect the correct total loss amount of $1,725,000.

Hackers breached the security of the database for the grocery store where plaintiffs shop. The district court determined that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Maine law for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied warranty, strict liability, and failure to notify customers. Although the court concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged breach of implied contract, negligence, and violation of the unfair practices portion of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, it dismissed those claims because alleged injuries were too unforeseeable and speculative to be cognizable under Maine law. The First Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed dismissal of the negligence and implied contract claims. Mitigation damages are available under those claims, for card replacement costs and credit insurance.

Defendant was prohibited from possessing a computer or accessing the internet while on home confinement, after being released from prison following a 2005 plea of guilty to wire, mail, and bank fraud. He nonetheless used the internet for a check-kiting scheme and, in 2010, was charged under 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud), 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud) and with escape. He was found guilty and sentenced to concurrent terms of 80 months, followed by supervised release with limits on internet and computer use. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that a jury could reasonably infer that the banks were FDIC-insured at the time of the offenses and that defendant used the mail as part of his schemes. The special conditions imposed on release are reasonably related to the goals of supervised release. The calculation of loss, including a fraudulent $1.4 million check that did not result in any actual loss, was not clear error.

This case arose from a consolidated appeal. In the underlying cases, the respective property owners failed to satisfy their debt obligations to professional lending institutions, which precipitated the foreclosure proceedings. In both cases, the professional lenders asserted that their respective mortgages were superior to the general tax liens filed pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 134.420(2). The circuit court entered a judgment granting the professional lenders' liens priority over the other liens. The court of appeals determined that the circuit court had erred in reordering the priorities and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the prior-recorded section 134.420(2) tax liens enjoyed priority pursuant to the long established first-to-file doctrine; and (2) the doctrine of equitable subrogation does not act to relieve a professional lender of a negligent title examination.

A group of investors (Borrowers) bought a golf course by contributing part of the purchase amount in cash and financing the remaining balance through a nonrecourse loan with Community Bank of Nevada (CBN). To facilitate the sale, William Walters entered into a separate guaranty with CBN where he personally guaranteed the loan. Prior to the Borrowers' default and the eventual foreclosure of the golf course, Walters filed a complaint against CBN, asserting causes of action for declaratory relief and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. CBN counterclaimed, asserting breach of guaranty against Walters. The district court granted summary judgment in part to CBN, concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to Walters' guaranty liability to CBN. Walters filed a petition for a writ compelling the district court to vacate its partial summary judgment in favor of CBN and to preclude CBN from recovering any amount from Walters under his guaranty. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) CBN complied with the deficiency application requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 40, and (2) CBN was not attempting double recovery because double recovery was not an issue in this case.

In this dispute between a law firm and two banks, the issues presented were (1) the scope of the duty a payor bank owed to a non-customer depositor of a counterfeit check and (2) the scope of the duty a depository bank owed its customer when it acted as a collecting bank during the check collection process. The court held that neither the depository/collecting bank nor the payor bank violated any duty owed to the depositor and that summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted.

Defendant-Appellant Alan Tukes appealed his federal conviction for bank robbery, arguing that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) at the time of the crime. At trial, a prosecutor asked the bank’s branch manager: “Now, the Compass Bank, is that a bank that is federally insured by the [FDIC]?” She responded: “Yes, it is.” When asked whether the bank “has” any documentation proving its insured status, she replied: “Yes. We have a certificate.” When asked whether the certificate “hangs” in the branch, the manager replied in the affirmative. The district court admitted the certificate, dated November 8, 1993, into evidence. The government offered no additional evidence of the bank’s insured status. At summation, Defendant argued that the government had not proven that the bank was FDIC insured at the time of the robbery. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Tenth Circuit concluded "it is clear that a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured at the time of the robbery." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged.

Defendant, a licensed financial adviser, pled guilty to 34 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) based on his solicitation of bank clients to invest in speculative real estate transactions that he controlled, unrelated to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry known as "selling away." The Government accused him of collecting $1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. The district court denied his motion to withdraw the plea when he claimed that his prior attorney, unprepared to go to trial, had browbeaten him. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months and $1.3 million in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. With no evidence of actual innocence and the death of some of the government's elderly witnesses, there was no "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Because defendant was an investment advisor when he initiated the fraud, the court properly applied a four-level enhancement at section 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified by defendant's lies concerning his guilty plea and his contact with witnesses.

Debtor owned one parcel in Wisconsin and three in Michigan. Permanently disabled and unemployed, he obtained and defaulted on mortgages. The bank began foreclosure. Debtor sold one Michigan property and gave all proceeds to the bank, which continued its Wisconsin foreclosure. In the Michigan foreclosure, the bank bid the full amount of the loan (likely more than value) and obtained a deed. Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition before the Wisconsin foreclosure sale. The bank filed a proof of claim and motion for relief from the automatic stay to reverse foreclosure on the Michigan property and proceed with the Wisconsin sale. The bankruptcy court concluded that Debtor owed the bank nothing, so there was no reason to continue the Wisconsin foreclosure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bank made a unilateral mistake by bidding the entire amount of the debt at the Michigan foreclosure sale. The sale may not be invalidated, absent fraud. The bank is required by Michigan law to pay, or credit, Debtor the full amount of its bid and has been paid in full. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 558, Debtor is entitled to offset the Michigan sale credit bid against the Wisconsin judgment, satisfying the Wisconsin judgment so that Debtor no longer owes the bank any money.