Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class, sued defendant under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.231-408.241, alleging that defendant charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1 of the MSMLA. At issue was whether defendants violated the MSMLA by charging plaintiffs a loan discount, settlement/closing fee, document processing/delivery fee, and prepaid interest. The court held that plaintiffs did suffer a loss of money when defendant charged the loan discount, although plaintiffs received the loan discount amount two days later as part of a loan disbursement. The court also held that it could not decide whether the loan discount and the settlement/closing fee violated the MSMLA and remanded for further proceedings. The court further held that the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges and violated the MSMLA. The court finally held that because the processing/delivery free violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest was an additional violation of the statute. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a plastics manufacturer, dealt with a container company that filed for bankruptcy in 2002, filed a creditor's claim for more than $7 million, and objected to the sale of assets and lien priorities. The debtor had pledged all of its assets as security for a line of credit with ANB, its primary lender. Plaintiff claimed that there was a fraudulent scheme under which the debtor would produce containers and not pay for them, so that that they would be part of inventory when a successor company, let by insiders, purchased the assets in bankruptcy. After its claims were rejected in the bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff sued ANB and Gateway alleging violation of RICO (18 U.S.C. 1961) and common-law fraud. The district court dismissed as "res judicata" but denied Rule 11 sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, citing collateral estoppel, issue preclusion. The court did not find that the claims were frivolous or designed to harass.

Defendant-lender reported to credit agencies that two of plaintiff's mortgage payments were received late. Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 and alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, breach of contract, negligence, negligent supervision, conversion, and fraud. The district court entered summary judgment for the lender. The Third Circuit affirmed. A private litigant seeking to recover against a furnisher of information under the FCRA must first make a complaint to a consumer reporting agency; plaintiff did not comply with the structural framework of the statute.

Plaintiff purchased auction-rate securities from defendant, a securities broker-dealer. ARS are long-term bonds whose interest rates periodically reset through auctions and typically offer higher returns than treasuries or other money market instruments. Investors can liquidate at each auction, if demand exceeds supply. If sellers outnumber buyers, the auction fails. ARS underwriters may place proprietary bids, to prevent auctions from failing. If an auction fails, there is a penalty interest rate to compensate for temporary illiquidity and entice new buyers. When plaintiff wanted to sell in 2008, neither defendant nor underwriters would place proprietary bids, leaving plaintiff with $194 million in illiquid securities. Plaintiff discounted the price by millions of dollars. The district court dismissed a suit claiming: violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)), violation of Kentucky Blue Sky Laws, common-law fraud, promissory estoppel, and negligent misrepresentation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Many of defendant's purported misstatements and omissions are not actionable, either because they lacked materiality or because defendant had no duty to disclose them. Facts alleged in the complaint fall short of establishing scienter, as required to establish securities fraud.

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP); Countrywide Home Loans of Texas, Incorporated; and Countrywide Home Loans, Incorporated appealed an order for remand where the district court dismissed the lone federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667f, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Defendants argued that this was an abuse of discretion because Countrywide Home Loans of Texas was improperly joined and thus the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiffs argued that there was no improper joinder and that defendants waived any right to argue improper joinder or the existence of diversity jurisdiction when they failed to remove the action to federal court within 30 days of service of the original complaint that listed Countrywide Home Loans of Texas. The court held that defendants carried their burden of proving improper joinder; the district court had jurisdiction over the state law claims at the time of remand; and the exercise of that jurisdiction was mandatory. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to remand the state law claims to Texas state court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff US Bank National Association appealed a trial court order that granted summary judgment to Defendant Homeowner Christine Kimball and dismissed with prejudice US Bank’s foreclosure complaint for lack of standing.  On appeal, US Bank argued that it had standing to prosecute the foreclosure claim and that the court’s dismissal with prejudice was in error.  Homeowner cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in not addressing her claim for attorney’s fees. Homeowner purchased the property in question in June 2005.  To finance the purchase, she executed an adjustable rate promissory note in favor of Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. (Accredited).  The note was secured by a mortgage deed to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Accredited. In 2009, US Bank filed a foreclosure complaint for Homeowner’s failure to make required payments.  The complaint alleged that the mortgage and note were assigned to US Bank by MERS, as nominee for Accredited.  Attached to the complaint was a copy of the instrument signed by a "Duly Authorized Agent" of MERS.  The promissory note was also attached to the complaint and appended to it was an undated allonge signed by a corporate officer of Accredited, endorsing the note in blank. Homeowner moved for summary judgment claiming, among other things, that US Bank failed to present sufficient evidence that it held homeowner’s note and corresponding mortgage. Because neither note submitted by US Bank was dated, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the note was endorsed to US Bank before the complaint was filed.  Therefore, the court held that US Bank lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action.  Following a hearing, the court denied the motions for reconsideration and to amend the complaint.  The court concluded that US Bank had submitted a defective complaint and the deficiencies were not mere technicalities, but essential items, without which the case could not proceed.  The court held that US Bank lacked standing when the complaint was filed, and dismissed the complaint “with prejudice.”  Upon review of the trial record and briefs submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects but for the 'with prejudice': "this may be but an ephemeral victory for homeowner.  Absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, the dismissal cannot cancel her obligation arising from an authenticated note, or insulate her from foreclosure proceedings based on proven delinquency." The Court dismissed the foreclosure complaint and remanded the case for consideration of the parties' fees dispute.

This case arose when the SEC brought suit against Stanford Group Company (SGC), along with various other Stanford entities, including Stanford International Bank (SIB), for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. In this interlocutory appeal, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction that the receiver subsequently obtained against numerous former financial advisors and employees of SGC, freezing the accounts of those individuals pending the outcome of trial. The court held that the district court had the power to decide the motion for preliminary injunction before deciding the motion to compel arbitration; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction; the preliminary injunction was not overbroad; and the district court acted within its power to grant a Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 24.005(a)(1), injunction rather than an attachment; and that the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded the motion to compel arbitration for a ruling in the first instance.

This case arose when elderly widow Dorothy Chase Stewart filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Wells Fargo Bank filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court reciting debts owed from an outstanding mortgage on Ms. Stewart's house. The bankruptcy court subsequently found that Wells Fargo's mortgage claims exhibited systematic errors arising from its highly automated, computerized loan-administration program and issued an injunction requiring Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it had filed on or filed after April 13, 2007; to provide a complete loan history on every account and file that history with the appropriate court; and "to amend...proofs of claim already on file to comply with the principles established in this case and [In re] Jones." Wells Fargo appealed, challenging the claim amount and the injunction. The court vacated the injunction as exceeding the reach of the bankruptcy court. Because neither the injunction nor the calculation of Ms. Stewart's debt was properly before the court, the court dismissed as moot Wells Fargo's appeal of legal rulings underlying the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the mortgage.

The district court granted a default judgment of foreclosure in favor of the mortgage company. Following a sale, at which the mortgage company was the successful bidder, the court granted a motion to set aside the sale because the mortgage company had failed to notify a junior lien holder of the sale, as required by state law, so that the junior lien remained in place. The court subsequently granted the junior lien holder's motion to vacate the set-aside order, reasoning that the notice issue involved an independent question of state law and was not properly before it. The Third Circuit vacated. The court's diversity jurisdiction extends to resolving issues that arise from an error committed during the pendency of its jurisdiction over a marshal's sale that it ordered. No overriding state policy or matter of substantial public concern, justifying abstention, was implicated in this case.

Plaintiffs, evicted from their home following a state court foreclosure judgment, sought relief in federal court. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly considered the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and concluded that the doctrine applied to only two of the 22 claims: those that claimed injury caused by the state-court judgment of foreclosure, as opposed to injury caused by the defendants’ actions in enforcing the judgment. Plaintiffs offered no evidence of discriminatory motive with respect to their race or disabilities and did not allege specific facts establishing that there were material facts in dispute.