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In 2005, Nicholas and Mary Conroy refinanced their home with a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. Five years later, the Conroys stopped making payments and defaulted on their loan. In an effort to avoid foreclosure, the Conroys filed suit against defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; Fidelity National Title Insurance Company aka Default Resolution Network, LLC; and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as trustee for Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Trust, Series 2007-2 (Wells Fargo). The trial court sustained Wells Fargo’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. On appeal, the Conroys contended the trial court erroneously dismissed their claims. After review, the Court of Appeal found the Conroys’ operative complaint did not state valid causes of action for intentional or negligent misrepresentation because they did not properly plead actual reliance or damages proximately caused by Wells Fargo. The trial court properly determined the Conroys could not assert a tort claim for negligence arising out of a contract with Well Fargo. For lack of detrimental reliance on any of Wells Fargo’s alleged promises, the Conroys did not set forth a viable cause of action for promissory estoppel even under a liberal construction of the operative complaint. Because Wells Fargo considered and rejected a loan modification for the Conroys before that date, section 2923.6 does not apply to them. The plain language of section 2923.7 requires a borrower to expressly request a single point of contact with the loan servicer. The Conroys’ operative complaint did not allege they ever requested a single point of contact, and the Conroys did not state they could amend their cause of action to allege they actually requested one. The trial court properly dismissed the Conroys’ Unfair Competition Law claim because it was merely derivative of other causes of action that were properly dismissed. View "Conroy v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Baker Lofts purchased an abandoned building for renovation. Loans of more than $5 million from Huntington were secured by two mortgages on the building and by personal property, including a tax-increment-financing agreement, rental income, and Baker’s liquor license. Baker defaulted in 2011. Huntington assigned the 2005 mortgage to its subsidiary, Fourteen, which foreclosed by public auction. The Notice stated that “[t]he balance owing on the Mortgage is $5,254,435.04,” but did not mention the senior 2004 mortgage, which Huntington retained. Fourteen, the only bidder, purchased the property for $1,856,250. Huntington released the 2004 mortgage. Fourteen sold the property for $2,355,000. Huntington thought that Baker still owed $3.5 million and invoked its security interests in the remaining collateral. At a public sale, Huntington bought the rights to Baker's tax-increment-financing agreement for $1,107,000; began collecting rents; and asserted its security interest in the liquor license, which Baker had sold before it declared bankruptcy. Assignees of Baker's legal claims sought a declaratory judgment that the sale of the building extinguished all of Baker’s debt. They also raised conversion and tortious interference claims and a claim under Michigan’s secured transactions statute. The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed Huntington's judgment. The district court correctly concluded that Baker’s debt exceeded the value of the foreclosed building and that excess permitted Huntington to take possession of the other property securing its loans. View "DAGS II, LLC v. Huntington National Bank" on Justia Law

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McNeil opened a business checking account with Defendant. A “Master Services Agreement,” stated: [W]e have available certain products designed to discover or prevent unauthorized transactions, …. You agree that if your account is eligible for those products and you choose not to avail yourself of them, then we will have no liability for any transaction that occurs on your account that those products were designed to discover or prevent. McNeil was not given a signed copy of the Agreement, nor was he advised of its details. McNeil ordered hologram checks from a third party to avoid fraudulent activity. McNeil later noticed unauthorized checks totaling $3,973.96. The checks did not contain the hologram and their numbers were duplicative of checks that Defendant had properly paid. Defendant refused to reimburse McNeil, stating that “reasonable care was not used in declining to use our ... services, which substantially contributed to the making of the forged item(s).” Government agencies indicated that they would not intervene in a private dispute involving the interpretation of a contract. Plaintiff filed a putative class action, citing Uniform Commercial Code 4-401 and 4-103(a), The district court dismissed, holding that the Agreement did not violate the UCC and shifted liability to Plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiff stated a plausible claim that the provision unreasonably disclaims all liability under these circumstances; the UCC forbids a bank from disclaiming all of its liability to exercise ordinary care and good faith. View "Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that the foreclosure sale of his house was invalid under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 3953(a), 3953(c), which requires a lender to obtain a court order before foreclosing on or selling property owned by a current or recent servicemember where the mortgage obligation "originated before the period of the servicemember's military service." The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo, holding that plaintiff's mortgage obligation originated when he was in the Navy, it was not a protected obligation under section 3953(a), and his later enlistment in the Army did not change that status to afford protection retroactively. View "Sibert v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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HSBC and the government appealed the district court's grant of a motion by a member of the public to unseal the Monitor's Report in a case involving a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with HSBC. The Second Circuit held that the Monitor's Report is not a judicial document because it is not relevant to the performance of the judicial function. By sua sponte invoking its supervisory power at the outset of this case to oversee the government's entry into and implementation of the DPA, the court explained that the district court impermissibly encroached on the Executive's constitutional mandate to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that a district court could revoke a speedy trial waiver were it to later come to question the bona fides of a DPA, the presumption of regularity precludes a district court from engaging in the sort of proactive and preemptive monitoring of the prosecution undertaken here. View "United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

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Marty and Cindy Frantz executed a series of commercial guaranties so that Idaho Independent Bank (“Bank”) would lend money to Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. (“Eagle Ridge”), a closely held corporation in which the Frantzes held a majority interest. Bank filed this action against the Frantzes to recover on their commercial guaranties. The Frantzes filed an answer in which they admitted the material allegations in the complaint, but asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaims against Bank. They later amended their answer to include a third-party claim against Eagle Ridge. The Frantzes initially filed a petition under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code the day before Mr. Frantz’s deposition was to occur; the Frantzes’ bankruptcy was converted to a liquidation case under chapter 7, and a trustee was duly appointed for the estate. Less than two weeks before the trial on Bank’s adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case, the Frantzes filed a voluntary waiver of discharge, and the bankruptcy court approved the waiver. As a result, the bankruptcy court was deprived of jurisdiction to hear the adversary proceeding, and it dismissed it without prejudice. However, the court did award sanctions in the sum of $49,477.46 against the Frantzes and their attorney, jointly and severally, for their conduct during the course of the adversary proceeding. The court found that their conduct constituted misuse of litigation tactics to cause economic injury to an opponent and its counsel in the form of increased litigation costs. Bank filed a notice in this case that because of the waiver of discharge, the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court was terminated. Bank then moved for summary judgment. The district court entered a judgment against the Frantzes “in the amount of $9,193,546.50, plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of $2,475.02 per diem from September 16, 2015, until the date this Judgment is entered.” Because the Frantzes' third-party claim against Eagle Ridge that was yet unresolved, the court certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Frantzes filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court denied that motion. They then timely appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying them affirmative defenses based upon an alleged breach of contract. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Independent Bank v. Frantz" on Justia Law

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The D.C. Circuit held that the district court properly entered summary judgment for judicial foreclosure to the property at issue, because D.C. law allows the holder of a note to enforce the deed of trust by judicial foreclosure. In this case, there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the Bank holds the Note. The court rejected defendant's counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as defendant's counterclaim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Furthermore, the Bank has carried its burden of showing there was no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the quiet title counterclaim; defendant forfeited his claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); and, in regard to the civil conspiracy claim, defendant failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Henderson" on Justia Law

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Linda Shelley executed a note in favor of First Magnus Financial Corporation. On the same day, Linda and John Shelley executed a mortgage on certain property as security for the loan. The note was endorsed in blank and was eventually held by MTGLQ Investors, L.P. John and Linda later deed the property to Shelley Alley. After Linda died, the note went into default. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a foreclosure complaint, naming John Shelley as the defendant and Alley as a party in interest. The trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of MTGLQ. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the debtor - presumably, the Estate of Linda Shelley - was a necessary party to this foreclosure action. Because the debtor was not named as a party in this matter, and court vacated the judgment of foreclosure and remanded with instructions to dismiss the matter without prejudice. View "MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v. Alley" on Justia Law

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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. appealed a circuit court's denial of its claim for attorney fees against National Bank of Commerce ("NBC"). The claim at issue in this appeal stemmed from a lawsuit concerning the deposit of a check issued by Jennifer Champion, treasurer of Jefferson County, for $178,916.42 in settlement of claims made in Winston v. Jefferson County, a class-action lawsuit concerning excess tax bids. The check was drawn on Jefferson County's account with Wachovia Bank, N.A. (a predecessor to Wells Fargo), and it was jointly payable to the order of Carl Prewitt, Debra Prewitt, Renasant Bank, and Moore Oil Co., Inc. ("Moore Oil"). After the check was issued, it was mailed to the Prewitts, received by Debra Prewitt. The check was stamped "for deposit only," and it was deposited to an account in the name of Liberty Investing, LLC ("Liberty Investing"), at Red Mountain Bank (a predecessor to NBC), using a remote scanner that was provided by NBC's predecessor to Creative Edge Landscaping, Inc. It is undisputed that the check was deposited without endorsements and that the Prewitts were not signatories on the Liberty Investing account. Wells Fargo's predecessor paid the check and debited Jefferson County's account. The Prewitts received the proceeds of the check over time through a series of withdrawals and transfers from the Liberty Investing account. Moore Oil became aware of the check, and by a letter it demanded that Jefferson County pay Moore Oil the amount of the check because, Moore Oil contended, it was entitled to the proceeds of the check. The Alabama Supreme Court fetermined Wells Fargo's claim for reimbursement of attorney fees expended in defense of the claim brought by Moore Oil lacked support in the applicable statutory scheme. Furthermore, neither of the "special equity" rules under which Wells Fargo claimed entitlement to reimbursement of its attorney fees was applicable in this situation. Finding no reversible error as to the denial of attorney fees to Wells Fargo, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. National Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Corner Credit Union applied for a master account from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The Reserve Bank denied the application, effectively crippling the Credit Union’s business operations. The Credit Union sought an injunction requiring the Reserve Bank to issue it a master account. The district court dismissed the action, ruling that the Credit Union’s stated purpose, providing banking services to marijuana-related businesses, violated the Controlled Substances Act. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice. By remanding with instructions to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice, the Court’s disposition effectuated the judgment of two of three panel members who would allow the Fourth Corner Credit Union to proceed with its claims. The Court denied the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s motion to strike the Fourth Corner Credit Union’s reply-brief addenda. View "Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas" on Justia Law