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Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC defaulted on a loan in which Utah First Federal Credit Union owned a fifty-two percent interest and RADC/CADC Venture, LLC (RADC) owned a forty-eight percent interest. Utah First filed a deficiency action against Dog Lagos, Mellon Valley, and several guarantors (collectively, Dos Lagos). After the statute of limitations had expired, Utah First filed an emended complaint adding RADC as a party plaintiff. The district court awarded RADC the full amount of the loan, concluding that the amended complaint related back to the date of the original complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it found that RADC’s claim was not time barred and awarded RADC the full deficiency amount. View "2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667f, seeking to rescind their 2006 mortgage. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not receive sufficient copies of disclosures required by TILA at the December 2006 closing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, holding that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether they received only one notice. The court explained that a borrower's own conclusory denial of receipt of TILA disclosures, unaccompanied by details or other evidence supporting the denial, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of delivery created by section 1635(c). Therefore, plaintiffs' three-day rescission window of section 1635(a) barred their request for rescission. The court also held that plaintiffs did not raise any specific objections to the accuracy of the disclosure statement during the first summary judgment proceedings. Therefore, the district court's finding was the law of the case and plaintiffs' allegations were waived. Even if the argument were not waived, plaintiffs cannot prevail because the alleged error was not a violation of TILA. View "Keiran v. Home Capital" on Justia Law

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After Wells Fargo foreclosed upon Plaintiff’s home, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Wells Fargo, asserting six causes of action. The superior court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all six counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s claim that Wells Fargo breached federal guidelines regarding loan modification review and improperly foreclosed on her home while her loan modification request was pending was not properly preserved for appeal; (2) Wells Fargo did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) the superior court justice did not err in finding that Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof on her claim that her reliance on the federal regulations should not have estopped Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the property. View "Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Wells Fargo appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing its foreclosure complaint against Defendant as a sanction for pretrial misconduct. After a nontestimonial hearing, the court ordered the action dismissed with prejudice. Wells Fargo moved to alter or amend the judgment to provide for a dismissal without prejudice. The district court denied the motion and maintained the dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the district court to conduct a proceeding that comports with the process recently articulated in Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, ___ A.3d ___, issued on April 11, 2017, holding that the process used by the trial court did not entirely follow the procedural steps that a court should take before imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Welch-Gallant" on Justia Law

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Appellants were minority stockholders in First Community Bank of Crawford County (FBC). After First Bank reached an agreement to merge with FCB, First Bank filed an application with the Arkansas State Banking Board. The Board subsequently approved the merger. Appellants filed a complaint seeking review of the Board’s decision, arguing (1) the Board did not adequately fulfill its duties under administrative law in reaching its decision, and (2) the statues and regulations followed by the Board unconstitutionally infringe on the due process and property rights of minority stockholders. The circuit court concluded that Appellants failed to preserve their substantive objections due to their failure to present these objections before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellants’ claims, holding that Appellants’ arguments were not preserved for judicial review. View "Booth v. Franks" on Justia Law

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Appellants, the majority shareholder of Banca Privada d'Andorra S.A., filed suit claiming that FinCEN violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing a Notice of Finding and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to cut off the Bank's ties to the United States' financial system. While the case was pending, FinCEN withdrew both Notices and the district court subsequently granted FinCEN's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds. The DC Circuit held that the case should be dismissed, but for different reasons than the district court. The DC Circuit explained that when FinCEN withdrew the Notices, appellants received full relief on their first claim. Therefore, the first claim of relief was moot. As for appellants' second claim, they no longer have standing to press this claim, because appellants have not met their burden of demonstrating that they still had standing to seek a declaratory order that the Notices were unlawful. Furthermore, even assuming that appellants do have the requisite injury and causation to support standing, they failed to show that a judicial order would effectively redress their alleged injuries. View "Cierco v. Mnuchin" on Justia Law

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From 1999-2010, Wilcox made loans to Hardwick. In 2013, Hardwick filed suit to recover usurious interest and prevent Wilcox from foreclosing on the property securing his loans. Wilcox countersued for breach of contract and judicial foreclosure. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Hardwick, finding that usurious interest payments made over the course of the relationship offset the principal debt and that Hardwick could recover $227,235.83 in interest payments he made during the two years before the filing of the lawsuit. Under California law, when a loan is usurious, the creditor is entitled to repayment of the principal sum only. He is entitled to no interest whatsoever. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Wilcox’s arguments that, in a forbearance agreement, Hardwick waived his usury claim with respect to any loan payment he made before April 2012 and that the statute of limitations barred Hardwick’s claim with respect to any loan that was paid off more than two years before the lawsuit was filed.The court reasoned that the payments made before the two-year limitations period were applied to offset principal, so only the later payments were subject to recovery. View "Hardwick v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim, holding that the trustee of a California deed of trust is a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Actions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect "debt" as that term is defined by the FDCPA; enforcement of a security interest will often involve communications between the forecloser and the consumer; and when these communications are limited to the foreclosure process, they do not transform foreclosure into debt collection. The panel explained that, because the money collected from a trustee's sale is not money owed by a consumer, it is not "debt" as defined by the FDCPA. In this case, the notices at issue did not request payment from plaintiff, but merely informed her that the foreclosure had begun, explained the timeline, and apprised her of her rights. Therefore, the panel held that ReconTrust's activities fell into the category of enforcement of a security interest, rather than general debt collection. View "Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust" on Justia Law

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The parties' dispute arose out of transactions originating from the savings and loan crisis during the 1970's and 1980's. Washington Mutual appealed a judgment entered in favor of the Government after a bench trial in a tax refund action. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Washington Mutual did not meet its burden of establishing a cost basis for its intangible assets. The panel concluded that the district court held Washington Mutual to the correct burden; did not make any clearly erroneous factual findings; permissibly determined that the cumulative fundamental flaws underlying the Grabowski Model rendered it incapable of producing a reliable value for the Missouri Branching Right; and was thus not required to sua sponte assign a value to that Right. Even assuming the Missouri Branching Right could be valued, Washington Mutual nonetheless failed to show reversible error as to the denial of its abandonment deduction. View "Washington Mutual v. United States" on Justia Law

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Linda Clarke filed suit against First National Bank of Omaha (FNB) alleging that she, rather than Gregg Graham, was the owner of a certificate of deposit. FNB filed a third-party action seeking recovery against Graham to the extent FNB was liable to Clarke. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Clark against FNB and in favor of FNB against Graham. Graham filed a motion for new trial. Before the court had ruled on the motion, Graham filed his notice of appeal. FNB filed a motion for summary dismissal, arguing that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was prematurely filed. The court of appeals overruled the motion for summary dismissal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Graham’s notice of appeal was prematurely filed and, therefore, was without effect. View "Clarke v. First National Bank of Omaha" on Justia Law