Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

R.E.E. & C. Capital Management Services, Inc. (buyer) appealed a trial court order granting People’s United Bank’s motion to compel buyer to complete the purchase of a foreclosed commercial property. Buyer raised three arguments: (1) it was not a party to the foreclosure sale, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to compel it to purchase the property; (2) the trial court erred in declining to apply the statutory remedy; and, (3) the trial court erred in ordering specific performance because an adequate remedy at law exists. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined a high bidder’s successful bid in a judicial sale, and the court’s subsequent confirmation of the foreclosure sale pursuant to 12 V.S.A. 4954(a), renders a buyer a limited party such that the court is authorized to issue orders directing the buyer’s action relative to the property’s purchase. The Court found 12 V.S.A. 4954 (e) did not limit the Bank’s remedies: “the legal right to an agreement’s completion does not arise exclusively from Vermont’s foreclosure statutes.” However, the Supreme Court found that while specific performance was a permissible remedy in some instances, the trial court did not engage in the analysis of whether this case was one of those instances. Therefore, the trial court’s order of specific performance was an abuse of its discretion, leading the Supreme Court to reverse and remand this case for the trial court to perform that analysis. View "People's United Bank, NA v. Alana Provencale, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court’s judgment dismissing US Bank’s complaint against HLC Escrow, Inc. and First American Title Insurance Company, vacating only its dismissal of US Bank’s claim against First American alleging violation of Maine’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (USCPA), which the First Circuit concluded was timely filed.US Bank, the current holder of a 2007 mortgage that incorrectly identified a parcel of unimproved land rather than the correct parcel of improved land that encompassed the mortgagors’ residence, sued the closing agent and the title insurer in 2016. The complaint included causes of action for negligence and “duty of care” against HLC Escrow, and negligence, unilateral mistake, and violation of USCPA against First American. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, concluding that Maine’s six-year statute of limitations for civil actions barred US Bank’s claims. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal with respect to US Bank’s USCPA claim against First American and otherwise affirmed, holding that the USCPA claim was timely for statute of limitations purposes but that the remainder of US Bank’s claims were untimely filed. View "US Bank, N.A. v. HLC Escrow, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court’s judgment dismissing US Bank’s complaint against HLC Escrow, Inc. and First American Title Insurance Company, vacating only its dismissal of US Bank’s claim against First American alleging violation of Maine’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (USCPA), which the First Circuit concluded was timely filed.US Bank, the current holder of a 2007 mortgage that incorrectly identified a parcel of unimproved land rather than the correct parcel of improved land that encompassed the mortgagors’ residence, sued the closing agent and the title insurer in 2016. The complaint included causes of action for negligence and “duty of care” against HLC Escrow, and negligence, unilateral mistake, and violation of USCPA against First American. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, concluding that Maine’s six-year statute of limitations for civil actions barred US Bank’s claims. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal with respect to US Bank’s USCPA claim against First American and otherwise affirmed, holding that the USCPA claim was timely for statute of limitations purposes but that the remainder of US Bank’s claims were untimely filed. View "US Bank, N.A. v. HLC Escrow, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia: 1) Whether Georgia's apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. 51-12-33, applies to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers; 2) whether section 51-12-33 abrogated Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert; and 3) whether, in a negligence action premised upon the negligence of individual board members in their decisionmaking processes, a decision of a bank's board of directors is a "concerted action" such that the board members should be held jointly and severally liable for negligence. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Loudermilk" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the bank in an action alleging violation of the Homeowners Protection Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the bank failed to make certain required disclosures in connection with their residential mortgage loans. The court held that the statute was clear that these mortgage insurance disclosures were mandated only if lender-paid mortgage insurance was a condition of obtaining a loan. In this case, because no such conditions applied to plaintiffs' loans, nondisclosure was not a violation of the Act. View "Dwoskin v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

At issue in this foreclosure case was whether presentment by a party’s attorney of an original, wet-ink note endorsed in blank is admissible into evidence and enforceable against the borrower without further proof that the holder had possession at the time the foreclosure action was filed.The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ summary disposition reversing the circuit court’s foreclosure judgment against Defendant in favor of Bank. Bank produced a note at trial, and the circuit court concluded it was the original note executed by the borrower. The court of appeals concluded that the issue of possession of the original note had to be proven at trial and that Bank was required to present testimony from a witness with personal knowledge who could verify possession of the note by Bank up to the moment Bank presented the note to the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that presentment to the trier of fact in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the original, wet-ink note endorsed in blank establishes the holder’s possession and entitles the holder to enforce the note. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Wuensch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bank in this quiet title action.Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to property he purchased at a tax sale. Bank, the mortgagee on the property and a defendant in the quiet title suit, alleged that Plaintiff’s tax deed was void. The district court granted summary judgment for Bank, concluding that the statutorily-required notice regarding redemption provided by Plaintiff to the property owner and to Bank was deficient and that the tax deed was void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bank had standing to challenge the validity of Plaintiff’s tax deed; (2) because Plaintiff failed to notify Bank of the redemption period, the tax deed was void; (3) the district court’s reference to a document not contained in the record was error, but it was not reversible error because that document was not relevant to the material facts in this case; (4) the doctrine of laches and unclean hands did not bar Bank’s arguments regarding the validity of the tax deed; and (5) Plaintiff’s statutory claims for reimbursement were not ripe for review. View "Montierth v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, hackers infiltrated the computer networks at Schnuck Markets, a large Midwestern grocery store chain based in Missouri, and stole the data of about 2.4 million credit and debit cards. By the time the intrusion was detected and the data breach was announced in 2013, the financial losses from unauthorized purchases and cash withdrawals had reached the millions. Financial institutions filed a class action, having issued new cards and reimbursed customers for losses as required by 15 U.S.C. 1643(a). They asserted claims under the common law and Illinois consumer protection statutes (ICFA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The financial institutions sought reimbursement for their losses above and beyond the remedies provided under the credit-debit card network contracts; neither Illinois or Missouri would recognize a tort claim in this case, where the claimed conduct and losses are subject to these networks of contracts. Claims of unjust enrichment, implied contract, and third-party beneficiary also failed because of contract law principles. The plaintiffs did not identify a deceptive guarantee about data security, as required for an ICFA claim, nor did they identify how Schnucks’ conduct might have violated the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act. View "Community Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc." on Justia Law

Linderman bought an Indianapolis house in 2004 and lived there with her ex-husband, their children, and her parents. In 2013, Linderman left and stopped paying the mortgage loan. The others left in 2014. The unoccupied structure was vandalized. U.S. Bank, which owns the note and mortgage, started foreclosure proceedings. The vandalism produced insurance money that was sent to the Bank. The city notified Linderman of code violations. Linderman hired a contractor. In 2015 the Bank disbursed $10,000 for repairs. The contractor abandoned the job. The house was vandalized twice more; a storm damaged the roof. Linderman has not hired a replacement contractor or asked the Bank for additional funds but inquired about the status of the loan and the insurance money. The Bank sent a response. Asserting that she had not received that response, Linderman sued under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of her claims. None of Linderman’s problems with her marriage and mental health can be traced to the Bank. Linderman does not explain how earlier access to the Bank’s record of the account could have helped her; some of her asserted injuries are outside the scope of the Act. The contract between Linderman and the Bank, not federal law, determines how insurance proceeds must be handled. Contract law also governs the arrangement between Linderman and the contractor. View "Floyd v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

Linderman bought an Indianapolis house in 2004 and lived there with her ex-husband, their children, and her parents. In 2013, Linderman left and stopped paying the mortgage loan. The others left in 2014. The unoccupied structure was vandalized. U.S. Bank, which owns the note and mortgage, started foreclosure proceedings. The vandalism produced insurance money that was sent to the Bank. The city notified Linderman of code violations. Linderman hired a contractor. In 2015 the Bank disbursed $10,000 for repairs. The contractor abandoned the job. The house was vandalized twice more; a storm damaged the roof. Linderman has not hired a replacement contractor or asked the Bank for additional funds but inquired about the status of the loan and the insurance money. The Bank sent a response. Asserting that she had not received that response, Linderman sued under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of her claims. None of Linderman’s problems with her marriage and mental health can be traced to the Bank. Linderman does not explain how earlier access to the Bank’s record of the account could have helped her; some of her asserted injuries are outside the scope of the Act. The contract between Linderman and the Bank, not federal law, determines how insurance proceeds must be handled. Contract law also governs the arrangement between Linderman and the contractor. View "Floyd v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law