Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Wis. Stat. 846.165 does not require a circuit court to make a determination of a guaranty credit at the time a foreclosure sale is confirmed. Further, when an action for foreclosure against a mortgagor and an action for a money judgment on a guaranty are brought in the same proceeding, the circuit court may decide the amount of a credit to be applied to a judgment on a guaranty either at the time the sale is confirmed or at another time.Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' decision directing that the circuit court apply a credit of $2.25 million to a money judgment entered against Petitioner as a guarantor of a loan. Petitioner argued that the court of appeals erroneously limited the credit to the amount of the winning bid at the sheriff’s sale, thus precluding the circuit court from hearing evidence of the fair value of the property after the confirmation of sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court properly decoupled the confirmation of sale from the determination of the guaranty credit; and (2) the stipulation in this case did not establish that the amount of the winning bid at the sheriff’s sale shall be the sole credit toward the money judgment against Petitioner. View "Horizon Bank, National Ass’n v. Marshalls Point Retreat LLC" on Justia Law

Although the Dodd-Frank Act significantly altered the regulatory framework governing financial institutions, with respect to National Bank Act (NBA) preemption, it merely codified the existing standard established in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). The Ninth Circuit applied that standard and held that the National Bank Act did not preempt California's state escrow interest law. In this case, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action alleging that Bank of America violated both California state law and federal law by failing to pay interest on his escrow account funds. The panel held that plaintiff could proceed with his California Unfair Competition Law and breach of contract claims against Bank of America. View "Lusnak v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Enacted in 2005, in response to the "debt treadmill," NRS Chapter 604A regulates the payday loan industry, including deferred deposit loans and loans with an annual interest rate greater than 40 percent. If a borrower cannot repay such a loan within 35 days, NRS 604A.480 subsection 1 allows for an extension but a licensee cannot extend the period beyond 60 days and cannot "add any unpaid interest or other charges accrued ... to the principal amount of the new deferred deposit loan or high-interest loan." However, under subsection 2, certain new deferred deposit or high-interest loans are exempt from those restrictions: A licensee may offer a new loan to satisfy an outstanding loan for a period of not less than 150 days and at an interest rate of less than 200 percent. The licensee must follow all of subsection 2's requirements for the new loan to be exempted. Subsection (2)(f) permits a loan under subsection 2 if the licensee does “not commence any civil action or process of alternative dispute resolution on a defaulted loan or any extension or repayment plan thereof." Reversing the district court, the Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 604A.480(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of enforcement action on a refinancing loan made under NRS 604A.480(2) and is not merely a condition precedent to making a refinancing loan under the subsection. View "State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. Dollar Loan Center., LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of defendants in an action filed by mortgage loan borrowers alleging violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Specifically, borrowers alleged that the lender did not provide the required number of copies of the required notice and material disclosures, and thus borrowers could rescind their loan on a date just shy of the three-year anniversary of loan execution. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that the signed acknowledgement borrowers had executed created a rebuttable presumption that they received the required number of copies and that borrowers' evidence was insufficient to overcome that rebuttable presumption. View "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

The Williams Parties brought suit against Fannie Mae and Wells Fargo, asserting claims against defendants for breach of contract premised on a violation of the notice terms in a Deed of Trust, violations of the Texas Property Code, and wrongful foreclosure. On appeal, the Williams Parties appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract claims against Fannie Mae and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Wells Fargo was not liable for breach of the Deed of Trust where the competent summary judgment evidence reflected that Wells Fargo was never a party to or an assignee of the Deed of Trust. Therefore, Wells Fargo had no liability and summary judgment for Wells Fargo was appropriate. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a motion for reconsideration and, on the merits, Fannie Mae's agreement in the deed of trust to give notice of foreclosure was independent of the Williams Parties' agreement under the note to pay monthly installments to satisfy the debt. Therefore, the court affirmed as to Wells Fargo, reversed as to the claim that Fannie Mae breached the deed of trust by failing to give notice, and remanded the claim against Fannie Mae for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Williams Parties brought suit against Fannie Mae and Wells Fargo, asserting claims against defendants for breach of contract premised on a violation of the notice terms in a Deed of Trust, violations of the Texas Property Code, and wrongful foreclosure. On appeal, the Williams Parties appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract claims against Fannie Mae and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Wells Fargo was not liable for breach of the Deed of Trust where the competent summary judgment evidence reflected that Wells Fargo was never a party to or an assignee of the Deed of Trust. Therefore, Wells Fargo had no liability and summary judgment for Wells Fargo was appropriate. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a motion for reconsideration and, on the merits, Fannie Mae's agreement in the deed of trust to give notice of foreclosure was independent of the Williams Parties' agreement under the note to pay monthly installments to satisfy the debt. Therefore, the court affirmed as to Wells Fargo, reversed as to the claim that Fannie Mae breached the deed of trust by failing to give notice, and remanded the claim against Fannie Mae for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Schwab filed suit seeking to recover for harm allegedly resulting from a conspiracy among major banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The district court dismissed Schwab's state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed both federal and certain state-law claims for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit vacated portions of the district court's judgment that dismissed Schwab's state-law claims concerning products sold in California for lack of personal jurisdiction; dismissed Schwab's Securities Exchange Act claims premised on misrepresentations and omissions that induced the purchase of floating-rate instruments on or after April 27, 2008; and dismissed Schwab's unjust enrichment claims against counterparties or a wrongdoer's affiliates as time-barred. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of RBC's motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff held a checking account with RBC and filed suit alleging that RBC failed to properly warn him of possible overdrafts at points of sale when he used his debit card and impermissibly rearranged the order of debit-card transactions so as to process larger transactions before smaller transactions. The court found it unnecessary to address the questions of waiver or the district court's alternative holding. Rather, the court held that PNC failed to demonstrate the requisite meeting of the minds to support a finding that the parties agreed through the February 2013 amendment to arbitrate their then-pending litigation. View "Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA)" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Tatis incurred a debt of $1,289.86 to Bally Fitness. Allied, a debt collector, sent Tatis a letter dated May 18, 2015 stating: “[The creditor] is willing to accept payment in the amount of $128.99 in settlement of this debt. You can take advantage of this settlement offer if we receive payment of this amount or if you make another mutually acceptable payment arrangement within 40 days.” The six-year New Jersey limitations period for debt-collection actions had already run. Tatis filed a class action, alleging that Allied’s letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692) because Tatis interpreted the word “settlement” to mean that she had a “legal obligation” to pay and the letter “[f]alsely represent[ed] the legal status of the debt" made “false threats to take action that cannot legally be taken,” and used “false representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect." The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Collection letters may violate the FDCPA by misleading or deceiving debtors into believing they have a legal obligation to repay time-barred debts even when the letters do not threaten legal action. The least-sophisticated debtor could plausibly be misled by the specific language used in Allied’s letter. View "Tatis v. Allied Interstate LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellants' respective claims against U.S. Bank and Ocwen. The court held that there was complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and affirmed the district court's denial of SGK and Katz's motion to remand; because there was no genuine dispute of material fact concerning U.S. Bank's authority to collect on the Note and enforce the Deed of Trust, the court affirmed the district court's grant of U.S. Bank's motion for summary judgment; the court affirmed the district court's denial of Weinreb's standing challenge; Weinreb's fraudulent representation claim was properly dismissed; and for the same reasons the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of SGK and Katz's original claims and the dismissal of Weinreb's fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the court held that SGK and Katz's attempts to pursue these claims would have been futile and the district court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing the amendment. View "SGK Properties, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Assoc." on Justia Law