Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of defendants in an action filed by mortgage loan borrowers alleging violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Specifically, borrowers alleged that the lender did not provide the required number of copies of the required notice and material disclosures, and thus borrowers could rescind their loan on a date just shy of the three-year anniversary of loan execution. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that the signed acknowledgement borrowers had executed created a rebuttable presumption that they received the required number of copies and that borrowers' evidence was insufficient to overcome that rebuttable presumption. View "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

The Williams Parties brought suit against Fannie Mae and Wells Fargo, asserting claims against defendants for breach of contract premised on a violation of the notice terms in a Deed of Trust, violations of the Texas Property Code, and wrongful foreclosure. On appeal, the Williams Parties appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract claims against Fannie Mae and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Wells Fargo was not liable for breach of the Deed of Trust where the competent summary judgment evidence reflected that Wells Fargo was never a party to or an assignee of the Deed of Trust. Therefore, Wells Fargo had no liability and summary judgment for Wells Fargo was appropriate. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a motion for reconsideration and, on the merits, Fannie Mae's agreement in the deed of trust to give notice of foreclosure was independent of the Williams Parties' agreement under the note to pay monthly installments to satisfy the debt. Therefore, the court affirmed as to Wells Fargo, reversed as to the claim that Fannie Mae breached the deed of trust by failing to give notice, and remanded the claim against Fannie Mae for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Williams Parties brought suit against Fannie Mae and Wells Fargo, asserting claims against defendants for breach of contract premised on a violation of the notice terms in a Deed of Trust, violations of the Texas Property Code, and wrongful foreclosure. On appeal, the Williams Parties appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract claims against Fannie Mae and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Wells Fargo was not liable for breach of the Deed of Trust where the competent summary judgment evidence reflected that Wells Fargo was never a party to or an assignee of the Deed of Trust. Therefore, Wells Fargo had no liability and summary judgment for Wells Fargo was appropriate. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a motion for reconsideration and, on the merits, Fannie Mae's agreement in the deed of trust to give notice of foreclosure was independent of the Williams Parties' agreement under the note to pay monthly installments to satisfy the debt. Therefore, the court affirmed as to Wells Fargo, reversed as to the claim that Fannie Mae breached the deed of trust by failing to give notice, and remanded the claim against Fannie Mae for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Schwab filed suit seeking to recover for harm allegedly resulting from a conspiracy among major banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The district court dismissed Schwab's state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed both federal and certain state-law claims for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit vacated portions of the district court's judgment that dismissed Schwab's state-law claims concerning products sold in California for lack of personal jurisdiction; dismissed Schwab's Securities Exchange Act claims premised on misrepresentations and omissions that induced the purchase of floating-rate instruments on or after April 27, 2008; and dismissed Schwab's unjust enrichment claims against counterparties or a wrongdoer's affiliates as time-barred. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of RBC's motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff held a checking account with RBC and filed suit alleging that RBC failed to properly warn him of possible overdrafts at points of sale when he used his debit card and impermissibly rearranged the order of debit-card transactions so as to process larger transactions before smaller transactions. The court found it unnecessary to address the questions of waiver or the district court's alternative holding. Rather, the court held that PNC failed to demonstrate the requisite meeting of the minds to support a finding that the parties agreed through the February 2013 amendment to arbitrate their then-pending litigation. View "Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA)" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Tatis incurred a debt of $1,289.86 to Bally Fitness. Allied, a debt collector, sent Tatis a letter dated May 18, 2015 stating: “[The creditor] is willing to accept payment in the amount of $128.99 in settlement of this debt. You can take advantage of this settlement offer if we receive payment of this amount or if you make another mutually acceptable payment arrangement within 40 days.” The six-year New Jersey limitations period for debt-collection actions had already run. Tatis filed a class action, alleging that Allied’s letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692) because Tatis interpreted the word “settlement” to mean that she had a “legal obligation” to pay and the letter “[f]alsely represent[ed] the legal status of the debt" made “false threats to take action that cannot legally be taken,” and used “false representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect." The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Collection letters may violate the FDCPA by misleading or deceiving debtors into believing they have a legal obligation to repay time-barred debts even when the letters do not threaten legal action. The least-sophisticated debtor could plausibly be misled by the specific language used in Allied’s letter. View "Tatis v. Allied Interstate LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellants' respective claims against U.S. Bank and Ocwen. The court held that there was complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and affirmed the district court's denial of SGK and Katz's motion to remand; because there was no genuine dispute of material fact concerning U.S. Bank's authority to collect on the Note and enforce the Deed of Trust, the court affirmed the district court's grant of U.S. Bank's motion for summary judgment; the court affirmed the district court's denial of Weinreb's standing challenge; Weinreb's fraudulent representation claim was properly dismissed; and for the same reasons the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of SGK and Katz's original claims and the dismissal of Weinreb's fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the court held that SGK and Katz's attempts to pursue these claims would have been futile and the district court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing the amendment. View "SGK Properties, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Assoc." on Justia Law

In the underlying operative complaint, plaintiff Dalia Rojas pleaded two causes of action against defendants HSBC Card Services Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together HSBC) based on HSBC's alleged violations of Rojas's right to privacy under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Privacy Act). Rojas alleged that HSBC intentionally recorded certain of her confidential telephone conversations in violation of: section 632(a), which prohibited one party to a telephone call from intentionally recording a confidential communication without the knowledge or consent of the other party; and section 632.7(a), which prohibited the intentional recording of a communication using a cellular or cordless telephone. Rojas appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HSBC. The Court of Appeal agreed with Rojas that, because HSBC did not meet its initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c (p)(2), the trial court erred in granting HSBC's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, that judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to enter an order denying HSBC's motion. View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services" on Justia Law

EvaBank appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Traditions Bank, TBX Title, Inc., and Terry Williams. In 2013, EvaBank customers William Michael Robertson and Connie Robertson, entered into a purchase agreement with Terry Williams, pursuant to which Williams agreed to purchase the Robertsons' property located on County Road 35 in Hanceville ("the property"). EvaBank held two mortgages on the property. Williams financed his purchase through Traditions Bank. TBX Title, a Traditions Bank subsidiary, acted as the closing agent for the real-estate transaction. EvaBank faxed Traditions Bank the payoff statement for the wrong EvaBank customer, Michael Roberson, with an address in Moulton, Alabama. TBX Title closed the real-estate transaction between the Robertsons and Williams. Traditions Bank thereafter delivered a check to EvaBank; EvaBank accepted and negotiated the check and applied the proceeds to the loan of Michael Roberson. TBX Title wired the net sales proceeds from the closing to the Robertsons. TBX Title recorded the warranty deed and mortgage and mailed the deed to Williams. When EvaBank contacted William Robertson about his loan being past due; Robertson responded that the loan should have been paid off at the closing with the proceeds from the sale. EvaBank learned at this point that there was a problem with the payoff statement it had provided. EvaBank sent Traditions Bank an e-mail explaining its mistake and noting that it had made a demand upon William Michael Robertson to pay the remaining balance due on the EvaBank mortgages but that Robertson had refused. Accordingly, EvaBank informed Traditions Bank that it would not release it mortgages encumbering the Robertsons' property until the balance on the loan they were securing had been fully satisfied. Traditions Bank sued EvaBank, asserting a claim of slander of title and seeking a judgment declaring that it was the first lienholder on the property. All parties moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Traditions Bank and TBX Title, on the basis of equitable estoppel, on the claims involving those parties and dismissed all other claims. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that Traditions Bank and TBX Title were on notice of one or more discrepancies between the payoff statement and the closing documents, which, through the exercise of due diligence, would have revealed the fact that the payoff statement was not for the loan secured by the Evabank mortgages encumbering the property being sold by the Robertsons. Therefore, the Court concluded as a matter of law, that Traditions Bank and TBX Title's reliance on the payoff statement, without further inquiry, was not reasonable. Accordingly, they could not rely on estoppel as a basis on which to claim a priority interest in the property. View "Evabank v. Traditions Bank, et al." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Banking Department (Department) initiated an adjudicative proceeding against CashCall, Inc. (CashCall), WS Funding, LLC (WS Funding), and John Paul Reddam, for violations of RSA chapter 399-A (2006 & Supp. 2012) (repealed and reenacted 2015). Reddam is the president and chief executive officer of CashCall, a lending and loan services corporation headquartered and incorporated in California. Reddam owned all of CashCall’s corporate stock. Reddam was also the president of WS Funding, a wholly owned subsidiary of CashCall. WS Funding was a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business in California. CashCall appeared to be engaged in the business of purchasing and servicing small loans or “payday loans” in association with Western Sky Financial. Neither Reddam, CashCall, nor WS Funding was licensed under RSA chapter 399-A to issue small loans in New Hampshire. In June 2013, after analyzing and reviewing CashCall’s responses to an administrative subpoena duces tecum and reviewing the business relationships among CashCall, WS Funding, and Western Sky Financial, the Department issued a cease and desist order to CashCall, WS Funding, and Reddam. In the cease and desist order, the Department found that either CashCall, or WS Funding, was the “actual” or “de facto” lender for the payday and small loans, and that Western Sky Financial was a front for the respondents’ unlicensed activities. Reddam challenged the Department’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the Department made a prima facie showings that: (1) Reddam’s contacts related to the Department’s cause of action; (2) he purposefully availed himself of the protection of New Hampshire law; and (3) it was fair and reasonable to require him to defend suit in New Hampshire. The Court therefore found no due process violation in the Department’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Reddam. View "Petition of John Paul Reddam" on Justia Law