Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Relator filed a quit tam action under the False Claims Act against Chase, alleging that Chase falsely claimed compliance with a Settlement. Relator also alleged that Chase falsely claimed compliance with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The DC Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff was required to exhaust his contentions pursuant to the procedures of the Settlement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims regarding the Settlement on a related basis. In this case, the Monitor was aware of the practices and concluded that Chase was in compliance. To the extent that relator vaguely alleged that Chase sought credit for loans that otherwise did not qualify for relief under the Settlement, the complaint nowhere identified any ineligible loan Chase submitted for credit, alleged that the Monitor was unaware of any such loan's disqualifying characteristics, or claimed that the cumulative value of any such loans exceeded the $250 million buffer. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that relator failed to state a claim that Chase falsely certified HAMP compliance because he did not allege, with factual allegations in support, that the certifications were materially false. View "United States ex rel. Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants on Bank’s complaint for a residential foreclosure, thus rejecting Bank’s allegations of error.On appeal, Bank argued that the district court erred in denying Bank’s motion to continue the trial and erred in determining that Bank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting loan servicing records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) Bank did not lay a proper foundation for admitting the loan servicing records at issue pursuant to the business records exception; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bank’s motion for a continuance because Bank did not establish a substantial reason as to why a continuance would further the interests of justice. View "Keybank National Ass’n v. Estate of Eula W. Quint" on Justia Law

In this case brought in connection with the sale of Plaintiffs’ home at a foreclosure sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’ asserted negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims against Bank of America, N.A. and ReconTrust Company, N.A. pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court held (1) the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to state sufficient facts entitling them to relief on all essential elements of their asserted negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and MCPA claims; and (2) the district court did not err by not sua sponte converting ReconTrusts’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(d) upon the filing of an affidavit in support of Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition. View "Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

The trial court in a second lawsuit against Defendants seeking reformation of a refinance deed of trust properly determined that the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel were satisfied and thus barred Plaintiffs from bringing the claims.Financial Institution, the former owner of a note for a refinance mortgage loan, sued Defendants, a married couple, for reformation of the refinance deed of trust because the wife had not signed the refinance deed of trust, leaving Financial Institution unable to institute foreclose proceedings against Defendants’ property. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. Three years later, the current owner of the note and the title insurer of the refinance mortgage loan (collectively, Plaintiffs) sued Defendants for reformation of the refinance deed of trust. The trial court again in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from bringing and relitigating the claims in the second lawsuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court in the second lawsuit (1) properly declined to apply judicial estoppel to bar Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs were in privity with Financial Institution; and (2) correctly determined that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Plaintiffs from relitigating their claims in the second lawsuit. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Georg" on Justia Law

In 2007, Fendon borrowed money from Bank of America, secured by a home mortgage. A borrower may rescind such a transaction for any reason within three days and for some reasons within three years, 15 U.S.C. 1635. Fendon alleges that he notified BOA on August 15, 2008; April 16, 2009; and June 17, 2010, that he was rescinding the loan, and that BOA ignored the first two notices and rejected the third. In 2011, BOA filed a foreclosure action. In 2016, a state court entered a final judgment confirming the foreclosure sale. Fendon filed suit under the Truth in Lending Act after the sale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Federal district courts lack authority to revise the judgments of state courts. Even damages relief, which would not disturb the state judgment, is untimely under the Act. If Fendon had filed suit before the foreclosure action, he might have had a strong argument that rescission could be enforced at any time but he did not. After BOA ignored his notices of rescission, he ignored BOA. By 2016, when he filed suit, the only possible relief was damages. BOA did not say or do anything after September 2008 that established either equitable tolling or estoppel. View "Fendon v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The Chois consulted in 2003 with defendants, who advised the Chois that an IRC 412(i) Plan retirement account would provide tax advantages, asset protection, and steady income. It required several steps including the purchase of “whole life” insurance for eventual exchange for American General Universal Life “Platinum” policies. The initial purchase was $1,275,000; a second purchase cost $439,000. The policies comprised 70-75 percent of the Plan portfolio. The IRS audited the Chois in 2006. Defendants changed their advice. Plaintiffs sued, alleging cash losses attributable to loss in value and that they were required to pay $440,000 in back taxes and interest, plus $60,000 in penalties, and faced future payments to the Franchise Tax Board of California and anticipated IRS penalties of $600,000. Defendants cross-complained for indemnity and comparative fault against American General. The trial court found the claims time-barred. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding a determination that the limitations period began to run in September 2007, when plaintiffs were “on notice” that the IRS would impose penalties, not in 2010 when penalties were assessed; the court declining to consider any tolling effect created by the ongoing fiduciary relationship; and application of the 2007 “notice” date as a bar to all claims. View "Choi v. Sagemark Consulting" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising from a foreclosure action, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in favor of Bank on Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on that claim.Plaintiffs filed claims against Bank for declaratory and injunctive relief, slander of title, and damages pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 33, 551. The business and consumer docket entered judgment in favor of Bank. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims presented a justiciable controversy; (2) the trial court did not err by granting Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ section 551 claim or slander-of-title claim; but (3) Plaintiffs were entitled, as a matter of law, to the declaratory relief they sought. View "Pushard v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Citibank provided sales financing to Illinois retailers who offered customers the option of financing their purchases, including the amount of Illinois tax due on the purchases. Citibank originated or acquired consumer charge accounts and receivables from the retailers on a non-recourse basis. When a customer financed a purchase using that account, Citibank remitted to the retailer the amount the customer financed, which included some or all of the purchase price and the sales tax owed based on the selling price. The retailers then remitted the sales tax to the state. Under the agreements between Citibank and the retailers, Citibank acquired “any and all applicable contractual rights relating thereto, including the right to any and all payments from the customers and the right to claim Retailer’s Occupation Tax (ROT) refunds or credits.” Citibank filed a claim for tax refunds under 35 ILCS 120/6 for ROT taxes paid through retailers on transactions that ultimately resulted in uncollectible debt. The Department denied Citibank’s claim. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial, noting the legislature’s clearly expressed preference in the statutory framework for reporting, remission, and refund only through the retailer. Sophisticated lending institutions no doubt anticipate the eventuality of default and can order their commercial relationships accordingly. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Illinois Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The M/V Deep Blue purchased fuel from a supplier, the supplier purchased the fuel from an affiliate, and the affiliate subcontracted with Radcliff. Radcliff subsequently asserted a maritime lien on the Deep Blue in a bid to recover directly from the ship, giving rise to this litigation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that Radcliff did not have a lien on the Deep Blue. Instead, a lien had arisen in favor of the global fuel supplier, and was duly assigned to ING Bank, an intervenor in the suit. View "Barcliff, LLC v. M/V Deep Blue" on Justia Law

Judgment creditors of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security sought to enforce underlying judgments obtaining the turnover of $1.68 billion in bond proceeds allegedly owned by Bank Markazi. The Second Circuit held that the settlement agreements released plaintiffs' non-turnover claims with respect to some but not all of the banks; the assets at issue were in fact located abroad, but that those assets may nonetheless be subject to turnover under state law pursuant to an exercise of the court's in personam jurisdiction, inasmuch as the district court has the authority under New York State law to direct a non‐sovereign in possession of a foreign sovereignʹs extraterritorial assets to bring those assets to New York State; and those assets will not ultimately be subject to turnover, however, unless the district court concludes on remand that such in personam jurisdiction exists and the assets, were they to be recalled, would not be protected from turnover by execution immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law