Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs obtained residential mortgage loans from M&T to finance the purchase of their homes and, because the loans exceeded 80% of the value of the residences, agreed to pay for private mortgage insurance. As is customary, M&T selected the insurers who, in turn, reinsured the insurance policy with M&T Reinsurance, M&T’s captive reinsurer. Beginning in 2011, counsel sent letters to Plaintiffs advising that they were investigating claims concerning M&T’s captive mortgage reinsurance. Plaintiffs agreed to be part of a lawsuit against M&T and filed a putative class action complaint alleging violations of the anti-kickback and anti-fee-splitting provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2607, and unjust enrichment. After discovery, the court granted M&T summary judgment, finding the claims time-barred and that Plaintiffs could not equitably toll the limitations period because none of them had exercised reasonable diligence in investigating any potential claims under RESPA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the one-year statute of limitations runs “from the date of the occurrence of the violation,” View "Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a borrower on a home loan secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust was assigned multiple times. After Plaintiff’s home was sold at public auction, Plaintiff filed this wrongful foreclosure action alleging that the assignment of the deed of trust to the foreclosing party bore defects rendering the assignment void. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff could not state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on the allegedly void assignment because she lacked standing to assert improprieties in the assignment where, as an unrelated third party to that assignment, Plaintiff was unaffected by such deficiencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a home loan borrower who has suffered a nonjudicial foreclosure has standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure based on an allegedly void assignment even though she was in default on the loan and was not a party to the challenged assignment because an allegation that the assignment was void will support an action for wrongful foreclosure. View "Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant was granted a default judgment against Bank of America and filed a praecipe for a writ of execution. BAC Field Services filed a motion to stay the execution of judgment and a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court granted the motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to clarify its reasoning. Thereafter, Appellant moved the trial court to reinstate the default judgment. When the court had not ruled on the motion, Appellant filed this action requesting writs of prohibition barring the trial court from vacating the default judgment and barring BAC from appearing in the case. The court of appeals denied the writs. After Appellant appealed, the trial court again vacated the default judgment and responded to the court of appeals’ instruction to clarify its reasoning. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) declared the petition for a writ of procedendo moot because the trial court had issued a decision clarifying its reasons for vacating the default judgment; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment denying Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition because the court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. Haley v. Davis" on Justia Law

JAS, Inc. purchased certain property at a trustee’s sale. JAS later filed a quiet title action, naming several defendants, including Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. (MERS), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and OneWest Bank, FSB. Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), the successor to Countrywide, later intervened. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BOA, concluding that the trustee’s sale of the property was void ab initio for failure to strictly follow Montana’s foreclosure laws. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly voided the sale on the basis of failure of strict compliance with the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana; and (2) the issue of JAS’s recovery of the funds it paid to OneWest Bank at the trustee’s sale was not properly before the Court. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

Petitioners executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. The notary acknowledgment on the mortgage was left blank. The mortgage was subsequently recorded with the county recorder. The interest in the mortgage was later assigned to Bank. Thereafter, Petitioners initiated a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the mortgage as defectively executed. The bankruptcy court determined that its interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code 1301.401 would be dispositive in this case and certified to the Supreme Court questions of state law concerning whether section 1301.401 has an effect on the case. The Supreme Court answered that section 1301.401 applies to all recorded mortgages in Ohio and acts to provide constructive notice to the world of the existence and contents of a recorded mortgage that was deficiently executed under Ohio Rev. Code 5301.01. View "In re Messer" on Justia Law

The Regional Utility Service Systems Commission (RUSS) brought a breach of contract action against the City of Mount Union. The district court entered judgment in favor of RUSS. The clerk of court subsequently issued a writ of general execution commanding the county sheriff to levy on all bank accounts held by the City at Iowa State Bank in Mount Union. The City filed a motion to quash the garnishment on the grounds that the bank account was exempt from execution under Iowa Code 627.18. The district court denied the motion to quash and claim of exemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bank account was exempt under section 627.18 because the general funds in the account were “necessary and proper for carrying out the general purpose” for which the City was organized. View "Reg’l Util. Serv. Sys. v. City of Mount Union" on Justia Law

Bank was the holder of a promissory note executed by Mortgagors and the mortgage that secured the note. After Mortgagors defaulted on the note Bank brought a foreclosure action and obtained an in rem judgment and decree of foreclosure against Mortgagors. More than two years after the entry of the original judgment, the property had not been sold, and Bank filed a notice of rescission of the foreclosure. Bank subsequently filed this foreclosure action and moved for summary judgment. Mortgagor counterclaimed for quiet title and wrongful foreclosure, arguing that she was entitled to own the property because the house was not sold within two years of the foreclosure decree. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two-year special statute of limitations in Iowa Code 615.1(1) does not limit the period of time for a mortgagee to rescind a prior foreclosure judgment. View "U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Callen" on Justia Law

At issue in this quiet title action was whether the two-year special statute of limitations in Iowa Code 615.1(1) applies only to judgment liens or whether the underlying debt is also extinguished after the end of the two-year period. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Callen, the two-year special statute of limitations in section 615.1(1) does not apply to rescission; and (2) Mortgagor’s unclean hands defense to foreclosure has been waived. View "Kobal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Amidst the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the Office of the State Bank Commissioner of Kansas declared The Columbian Bank and Trust Company insolvent, seized the bank’s assets, and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. The FDIC then sold many of the bank’s assets. Columbian Financial Corporation, the bank’s sole shareholder, sued the state bank commission and four commission officials (Judi Stork, Deryl Schuster, Edwin Splichal, and J. Thomas Thull). Columbian Financial alleged denial of due process from the seizure of bank assets, and sought equitable remedies and damages. The district court dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed, with the parties raising two issues: (1) whether the district court properly abstained under "Younger v. Harris," (401 U.S. 37 (1971)); and (2) whether Stork and Thull were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims for damages. The Tenth Circuit found that a state court proceeding was ongoing when the federal complaint was filed, and the state proceeding terminated while this appeal was pending. In light of this change of circumstances, the Court vacated the dismissal without prejudice on the equitable claims and remand for further proceedings. The Court also found that Stork and Thull enjoyed qualified immunity on the claim for damages because the alleged conduct would not have violated a clearly established constitutional right. View "Columbian Financial Corp. v. Stork" on Justia Law

Greg and Jessica Skinner appealed a judgment dismissing the Skinners’ claim of negligence against U.S. Bank Home Mortgage. U.S. Bank retained insurance funds received after the Skinners’ home was destroyed by fire and released a portion of the funds as the home was rebuilt. There were serious defects in the new construction that ultimately culminated in the project being abandoned. The Skinners claimed that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because U.S. Bank owed the Skinners a fiduciary duties regarding the disbursement of the insurance proceeds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home Mortgage" on Justia Law