Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Sentinel, a cash-management firm, invested customers' cash in liquid low-risk securities. It also traded on its own account, using money borrowed from BNYM, pledging customers’ securities; 7 U.S.C. 6d(a)(2), 6d(b)), and the customers’ contracts required the securities to be held in segregated accounts. Sentinel experienced losses that prevented it from maintaining its collateral with BNYM and meeting customer demands for redemption of their securities. Sentinel used its BNYM line of credit to meet those demands. In 2007 it owed BNYM $573 million; it halted customer redemptions and declared bankruptcy. BNYM notified Sentinel that it planned to liquidate the collateral securing the loan. The bankruptcy trustee refused to classify BNYM as a senior secured creditor, considering the use of customer funds as collateral to be fraudulent transfers, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(A) and claiming that BNYM was aware of suspicious facts that should have led it to investigate. The district judge dismissed the claim, finding that Sentinel had not been shown to have intended to defraud its customers. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Sentinel made fraudulent transfers. On remand, the judge neither conducted an evidentiary hearing nor made additional findings, but issued a “supplemental opinion” that BNYM was entitled to accept the collateral without investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. BNYM remains a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, but is an unsecured creditor because it was on inquiry notice that the pledged assets had been fraudulently conveyed. View "Grede v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Aliant Bank appealed the entry of an injunction against it by the Shelby Circuit Court enjoining it from interfering with a contract for the sale of real property between Kimberly and Kerry Carter, on the one hand, and Gregory and Robyn Nunley, on the other. The Carters owned, as joint tenants, a piece of real property located in Shelby County. The Carters used the property to secure a mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). In addition to the MERS mortgage, three creditors secured judgments against Kerry Carter against the property. Aliant was fourth to secure its judgment lien against Kerry Carter. On August 21, 2014, the Carters entered into a contract with the Nunleys for the sale of the property. At the time the Carters entered into the contract, the judgment liens against the property had not been satisfied. The preliminary settlement statement for the sale of the property indicated that a portion of the sale proceeds would be used to pay off the outstanding mortgage held by MERS on the property. The first judgment creditor thereafter agreed to release its judgment lien on the property in exchange for a smaller portion of the sale proceeds. The record did not indicate that the second or third judgment creditor agreed to release its judgment lien against the property. However, the record was clear that Aliant refused to release its judgment lien against the property. Apparently, Aliant's refusal to execute a release of its judgment lien inhibited the closing of the contract. On September 14, 2014, the Carters sued Aliant, alleging that Aliant had intentionally and maliciously refused to execute a partial release of the property "in order to prohibit [Kerry] Carter from being able to fulfill his obligations under the purchase contract even though all profits due Kerry Carter are being disgorged and paid to the appropriate judgment creditor, [the first judgment creditor]." The trial court granted an injunction against Aliant. Subsequently, Aliant petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its injunction order. The Supreme Court treated Aliant's petition for a writ of mandamus as a timely notice of appeal. After the Supreme Court recharacterized Aliant's petition, Aliant filed its appellant's brief. Instead of filing an appellee's brief, the Carters moved to dismiss Aliant's petition as moot, alleging that the property had been foreclosed upon by MERS. The Carters did not present the Supreme Court with any evidence indicating that MERS had, in fact, foreclosed upon the property. Aliant opposed the motion to dismiss. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Carters that the injunctive relief they requested was no longer attainable and that, consequently, the case was no longer justiciable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed Aliant's appeal. View "Aliant Bank v. Carter" on Justia Law

Charles and Gail Houpt appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank and First American Title Company (FATCO). In March 1993, the Houpts executed a promissory note to the American Bank of Commerce (Note). As security on the Note, the Houpts granted a deed of trust in the Property to American Bank of Commerce, as beneficiary, and FATCO, as Trustee (Deed of Trust). Over a period of time spanning from 1994 to 2004, American Bank of Commerce went through a series of mergers and transactions that resulted in Wells Fargo Bank obtaining the obligation owing under the Note and secured by the Deed of Trust. However, a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust designating Wells Fargo Bank as the beneficiary of such was not filed during this time. Starting in November 2007, the Houpts failed to make numerous payments on the Note and ceased all payments by the end of 2009. Consequently, Wells Fargo Bank directed FATCO to foreclose on the Property and on October 18, 2010, FATCO filed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale listing American Bank of Commerce as the current beneficiary and setting the date of the sale for February 17, 2011. The day before the scheduled trustee’s sale, the Houpts filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A year later Wells Fargo Bank was granted stay relief by the bankruptcy court and resumed foreclosure on the Property. The Houpts filed a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction stating that: (1) Wells Fargo Bank was not the beneficiary or other real party in interest of the Deed of Trust, and as such, Wells Fargo improperly initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure; (2) the district court should grant a preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure sale; and (3) Wells Fargo’s actions constituted wrongful foreclosure. Wells Fargo denied all claims made and argued that Wells Fargo Bank was the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust through merger and consolidation and, therefore, was exempted from having to record a written assignment of the Deed of Trust prior to exercising its power of sale. Notwithstanding this argument, Wells Fargo Bank obtained a written assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust from Wells Fargo Northwest on August 24, 2012, and recorded the assignment in 2012. The district court, noting that Wells Fargo had recorded its assignment of the Deed of Trust, denied the Houpts’ motion for preliminary injunction but left open the possibility that Wells Fargo had committed a wrongful foreclosure. Ultimately, the district court found that because no foreclosure sale had occurred, Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. After denying Houpts’ request for reconsideration, the district court entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo and awarded attorney fees and costs. The Houpts appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, but remanded for a determination of what effect, if any, a SBA payment and the date of default had on the interest and balance due under the Note. Further, the Court vacated the district court’s grant of attorney fees and costs and remanded for a determination of costs and fees with specific instruction to exclude all costs and fees incurred by Wells Fargo before September 4, 2012. View "Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baumans purchased Ohio property with a loan from Taylor, secured by a mortgage that listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as nominee on behalf of Taylor. In previous litigation involving the parties, the court found the loan was sold to Hudson in 2004. BAC became the loan servicer in 2008. In 2010, BAC brought a foreclosure action in state court. Under Ohio law, a party who seeks to foreclose on a mortgage must prove that “it is the current holder of the note and mortgage.” At the time, Hudson was the note holder, but BAC falsely represented that it had standing. BAC later voluntarily dismissed the case. The Baumans sued BAC’s successor, Bank of America, and Hudson alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court rejected the suit, finding that the defendants were not a “debt collector” under FDCPA because they acquired their interests in the debt prior to the Baumans's default. The Baumans filed a new complaint requesting a declaration barring a future foreclosure action and to quiet title. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that defendants were not required to bring a foreclosure action as a compulsory counterclaim to the FDCPA action. View "Bauman v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were individual investors in undeveloped real estate that purchased real property shortly before the collapse of the real estate market. In 2010, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to recover against a bank and its appraisers for their alleged participation in a scheme to defraud investors by artificially inflating property values. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that they would not have purchased the real property but for faulty appraisal information and that the bank should have disclosed the inflating appraised property values to them. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs did not receive the appraisals at the time of their decisions to purchase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because it was undisputed that Plaintiffs decided to purchase the investment properties without consulting an appraisal and obligated themselves to purchase the properties independent of the loan process, Defendants were entitled to dismissal of all claims. View "Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Wells Fargo in a suit stemming from plaintiffs' default on a home mortgage. Plaintiff asserted claims for common-law fraud and fraudulent inducement. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claimed damages are either categorically not damages, too speculative, or unsubstantiated assertions. Because plaintiffs failed to give proof to support an element of their fraud claims, the district court committed no error in granting summary judgment. The district court did not commit error, let alone plain error, in denying a continuance where plaintiffs filed only a one-line request for a continuance without any supporting evidence regarding the need for additional discovery or why existing discovery had been incomplete. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lawrence v. FHLMC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a bank, filed suit against multiple defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act. Three non-resident defendants (the “Ratings Agencies”) moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under a theory of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction; but (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action against the Ratings Agencies on the theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, holding that although Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy jurisdiction at this point, the case must be remanded for the trial court to determine if Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion. View "First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank, alleging federal and state law claims arising out of the modification of the deed of trust for plaintiffs' home. At issue is the retroactivity of 15 U.S.C.1641(g), a 2009 amendment to the 1968 Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Section 1641(g) requires a creditor who obtains a mortgage loan by sale or transfer to notify the borrower of the transfer in writing. The court held that section 1641(g) does not apply retroactively because Congress did not express a clear intent to do so. The court noted that its holding is consistent with numerous district court decisions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Talaie v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Ajayi, an electrical engineer, wanted to start a business selling MRI products in Africa. He incorporated GRI in Illinois and another company in Africa and sought investors. While traveling, he solicited a $45,000 investment from Brown. After returning home, Ajayi received a $344,657.84 check, payable to another company . He called Brown, who explained that the accounting department had made an error, told Ajayi to deposit the check, and stated that they would work out a way for Ajayi to refund the difference. Ajayi deposited the check through an ATM into his GRI account, which previously had a balance of $90.08, After the check cleared, Brown flew to Chicago and demanded repayment. Pursuant to Brown’s instructions, between December 9 and December 12, 2009, Ajayi wrote at least five checks to himself from the GRI account and cashed them. Ajayi was convicted of five counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and (2) and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957(a) and was sentenced to 44 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence that Ajayi knew that the check was altered and upheld the exclusion of the emails, but concluded that four bank fraud counts were multiplicitous. View "United States v. Ajayi" on Justia Law

Mark Galvin was the guarantor of a defaulted promissory note on a loan secured by an interest in a Cessna 421C aircraft. The note and security agreement were assigned to Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. After the borrower defaulted on the note, Harley-Davidson repossessed and sold the aircraft through a third-party dealer for $155,000 and then sought to collect $108,681 from Galvin. Galvin did not pay. Harley-Davidson subsequently filed a breach of contract action against Galvin to collect the deficiency. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Harley-Davidson, concluding that there was no dispute of material fact that the sale was “commercially reasonable.” The First Circuit reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the sale was “commercially reasonable,” and therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. Remanded. View "Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. v. Galvin" on Justia Law