Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Loan Tr. 2004-1, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-1, purchased a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure sale in 2010. On March 27, 2012, plaintiff 1010 Lake Shore Association mailed defendant a demand for payment of the unit’s assessments for common expenses. After defendant filed its answer, plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing there were no questions of material fact on the amount owed or defendant’s failure to pay the assessments. Based on section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (Act, 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2008)), plaintiff asserted that the lien against the property for the prior owner’s unpaid assessments had not been extinguished because defendant failed to pay the assessments accruing after it purchased the unit at the judicial foreclosure sale. Defendant responded that it could not be held liable under section 9(g)(3) of the Act for unpaid assessments that accrued before it purchased the unit at the judicial foreclosure sale. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff, and awarded plaintiff possession of the property. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court misconstrued section 9(g)(3) of the Act, arguing that a purchaser of a condominium unit at a foreclosure sale is only required to pay the common expenses that accrued following the sale. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, with one justice dissenting. Finding no error in the majority's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "1010 Lake Shore Ass'n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

Defendants acquired real property by borrowing more than $2 million from Whitefish Credit Union (WCU) and signing a promissory note to WCU, secured by mortgages on the property. Defendants later defaulted on that note, owing a principal balance of $1,951,670. WCU filed this action for foreclosure and collection of the debt. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to WCU for $1,100,000. Thereafter, WCU filed a request for entry of a deficiency judgment against Defendants for the amount of $745,365. Defendants opposed the request, arguing that the fair market value of the property exceeded the loan balance. After a hearing, the district court found the property was worth $2,366,667 as of the date of the sheriff’s sale and that no deficiency was owed to WCU. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding in equity to determine the fair value of the property for purposes of entering a deficiency judgment; but (2) evidentiary errors clearly affected the outcome of the proceeding to the prejudice of WCU. Remanded for further proceedings on the evidentiary issues and the applicable standard. View "Whitefish Credit Union v. Prindiville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BOA and Wells Fargo alleging, among other claims, that BOA had violated Section 51.002(d) of the Texas Property Code and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Tex. Fin. Code Ann. 392.301(a)(8), 392.303(a)(2), and 392.304(a)(8). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for BOA. The court concluded that, even if section 51.002(d) authorizes a private cause of action, plaintiff fails to state a claim because she did not allege that BOA attempted to send her a timely notice of sale or to initiate foreclosure. Further, the court concluded that, irrespective of any statutory notice requirements, BOA did not violate section 392.301(a)(8) of the TDCA by threatening to foreclose; plaintiff failed to allege a violation of section 392.303(a)(2); and plaintiff failed to establish any of the elements required by section 392.304(a)(8). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rucker v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association ("USB"), successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A., which was the successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4 ("the Trust"), and Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"), separately appealed a $3.9 million judgment entered against them on trespass and wantonness claims asserted by Chester and Emily Shepherd. USB also appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Shepherds on its claims related to an alleged error in a mortgage executed by the Shepherds upon which the Trust had foreclosed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. "'Every single one of these cases . . . rejects the availability of negligence and wantonness claims under Alabama law under comparable circumstances to those identified by the [plaintiffs]. Every one of these cases undercuts the legal viability of [the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims], and rejects the very arguments articulated by the [plaintiffs] in opposing dismissal of those causes of action. ... the mortgage servicing obligations at issue here are a creature of contract, not of tort, and stem from the underlying mortgage and promissory note executed by the parties, rather than a duty of reasonable care generally owed to the public. To the extent that the [plaintiffs] seek to hold defendants liable on theories of negligent or wanton servicing of their mortgage, [those negligence and wantonness claims] fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.'" View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant FirstMerit Bank, N.A. sought to enforce a money judgment against defendant-respondent Diana Reese by applying for an order assigning Reese’s interest in two trusts to FirstMerit and an order restraining her from otherwise disposing of her right to payment under the trusts. The trial court denied the motion. FirstMerit appealed, arguing: (1) Cod Civ. Proc. section 708.510 gave the trial court authority and jurisdiction to order Reese to assign FirstMerit funds she receives from the trusts; (2) section 708.520 gave the court authority to issue an order restraining Reese from transferring her interest in the trusts; and (3) section 709.010 did not affect the court’s authority or jurisdiction to enter such orders. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "FirstMerit Bank v. Reese" on Justia Law

The FHFA filed a summons with notice in state court asserting breach of contractual obligations to repurchase mortgage loans that violated representations and warranties and then Quicken removed the action to federal court. Plaintiff, as trustee of the subject residential mortgage‐backed securities trust, took control of the litigation and filed the complaint. Quicken moved to dismiss the suit. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that (1) the statute of limitations ran from the date the representations and warranties were made; (2) the extender provision of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act,12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(12), did not apply to the Trustee’s claim; and (3) the Trustee’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was duplicative. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l v. Quicken Loans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692k, as untimely. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that the FDCPA violation “occurred” when defendant sent the restraining notice. The court held instead that where a debt collector sends an allegedly unlawful restraining notice to a bank, the FDCPA violation does not “occur” for purposes of Section 1692k(d) until the bank freezes the debtor’s account. Because the record is unclear as to when the freeze actually took place, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Benzemann v. Citibank" on Justia Law

In 2011, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint against Jeffrey White. In 2014, based on an agreed-to judgment by the parties, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. Thereafter, White moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (4), alleging that Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose and that Wells Fargo’s failure to establish standing deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering the judgment void. The district court denied White’s motion, finding that White was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief pursuant to either Rule 60(b)(1) or (4), as (1) the parties had not been mistaken about the facts or the law regarding standing when they agreed to the entry of judgment; and (2) Plaintiff had a fair opportunity and a significant incentive to challenge Wells Fargo’s standing but failed to do so. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. White" on Justia Law

A Bank filed a residential foreclosure complaint against Appellant, alleging that Appellant executed a promissory note and a mortgage securing the note on certain property and that Appellant defaulted on the note. The Bank claimed that, through a series of endorsements and assignments, the Bank had acquired rights in the mortgage and authority to enforce the note. The trial court entered a judgment in Appellant’s favor, concluding that the Bank failed to provide Appellant with a statutorily-complaint notice of the default and of his right to cure. The court then prospectively reserved to the Bank the right to relitigate a second foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the judgment reserving to the parties the right to relitigate all issues in a future foreclosure action, as the trial court entered a final judgments on the merits in favor of Appellant, and there was no special reason identified for affirmatively reserving the parties’ rights to relitigate. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum" on Justia Law

Lorene and Harley Walter owned a certificate of deposit account with Bank of America. The account was a survivorship account and a payable-on-death account. After Harley died and while Lorene was still alive, the Bank distributed the funds in the account to Dwight Eisenhauer and Jo Ann Day, the named beneficiaries on the account, in equal sums. The Bank violated its deposit agreement with the Walters in doing so because these payments were made before Harley’s death. Eisenhauer, using his power of attorney, deposited his check into an account in Lorene’s name, making himself beneficiary upon her death. After Lorene died, Eisenhauer, as the independent executor of Lorene’s estate, sued the Bank for breach of the deposit agreement. The jury found that the Bank had failed to comply with the agreement but that the estate suffered no damages. The trial court subsequently granted judgment for Eisenhauer notwithstanding the jury’s verdict and rendered judgment for the amount that had been distributed to Day, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Eisenhauer, as the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the estate suffered no damages. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Eisenhauer" on Justia Law