Justia Banking Opinion Summaries

A Bank filed a residential foreclosure complaint against Appellant, alleging that Appellant executed a promissory note and a mortgage securing the note on certain property and that Appellant defaulted on the note. The Bank claimed that, through a series of endorsements and assignments, the Bank had acquired rights in the mortgage and authority to enforce the note. The trial court entered a judgment in Appellant’s favor, concluding that the Bank failed to provide Appellant with a statutorily-complaint notice of the default and of his right to cure. The court then prospectively reserved to the Bank the right to relitigate a second foreclosure action. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the judgment reserving to the parties the right to relitigate all issues in a future foreclosure action, as the trial court entered a final judgments on the merits in favor of Appellant, and there was no special reason identified for affirmatively reserving the parties’ rights to relitigate. The Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum" on Justia Law

Lorene and Harley Walter owned a certificate of deposit account with Bank of America. The account was a survivorship account and a payable-on-death account. After Harley died and while Lorene was still alive, the Bank distributed the funds in the account to Dwight Eisenhauer and Jo Ann Day, the named beneficiaries on the account, in equal sums. The Bank violated its deposit agreement with the Walters in doing so because these payments were made before Harley’s death. Eisenhauer, using his power of attorney, deposited his check into an account in Lorene’s name, making himself beneficiary upon her death. After Lorene died, Eisenhauer, as the independent executor of Lorene’s estate, sued the Bank for breach of the deposit agreement. The jury found that the Bank had failed to comply with the agreement but that the estate suffered no damages. The trial court subsequently granted judgment for Eisenhauer notwithstanding the jury’s verdict and rendered judgment for the amount that had been distributed to Day, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Eisenhauer, as the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the estate suffered no damages. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Eisenhauer" on Justia Law

Brown owed student loan debt, which he alleges Van Ru Credit was retained to collect. A Van Ru employee left a voicemail at Brown’s business that stated the caller’s and Van Ru’s names, a return number, and a reference number. The caller asked that someone from the business’s payroll department return her call. Brown sued Van Ru for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692c(b), alleging that the voicemail was a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” with a third party . The district court granted Van Ru judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The voicemail left at Brown’s business was not a “communication” as defined in the Act. A communication must “convey[] . . . information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium,” and the voicemail message did not convey such information. View "Brown v. Van Ru Credit Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant Caroline Marini on plaintiff EverBank’s complaint for foreclosure on a mortgage that Caroline signed in 2009 together with her co-defendant and then-husband Gary Marini. In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, following a hearing, the trial court concluded that Caroline was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on EverBank’s foreclosure complaint because the undisputed material facts established that Caroline signed the mortgage under the threat of physical violence from Gary and thus the mortgage was void as to her. The trial court also concluded that regardless of whether the mortgage was void as to Caroline, EverBank was not a bona fide purchaser. EverBank subsequently moved to alter or amend the judgment on the ground that the grant of summary judgment as to Caroline unjustly enriched her. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that EverBank had not raised the issue of unjust enrichment in response to Caroline’s cross-motion for summary judgment. EverBank appealed both decisions. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision granting summary judgment in favor of Caroline on the issue of whether the mortgage was void, and directed the trial court to enter judgment for EverBank on that issue. The Court remanded for trial the issues of whether the mortgage was voidable and, if so, whether it was enforceable because it was ratified by Caroline, but affirmed the trial court’s decision that the bona fide purchaser doctrine was not available to EverBank. View "Everbank v. Marini" on Justia Law

Earnest Magee sued Covington County Bank (CCB) for conversion after it seized collateral for a promissory note and later sold the property at auction. CCB moved under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss, arguing: (1) that the statute of limitations had expired; (2) that it had a contractual right to the property; and (3) that Magee’s claim was barred by issue preclusion. The circuit judge denied CCB’s motion and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Covington County Bank v. Magee" on Justia Law

Whitney and Pamela Smith entered into a residential mortgage contract with Saxon Mortgage Services (“Saxon”), which was secured with a promissory note on the Smiths’ home in Grant Parish. The Smiths later failed to make their installment payments beginning June 1, 2004. Two months later, Mr. Smith died in an automobile accident. On November 4, 2004, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase”), as trustee for Saxon, filed suit for executory process against the Smiths, seeking to deliver a notice of seizure to Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith, fearing that she would be evicted from her home over the holidays, moved her children out of the house and sought an injunction to stop the seizure by executory process. In support, she argued the foreclosure documents were not in authentic form pursuant to the requirements set forth in La. Code Civ. P. art. 2635(A)(2) because they were executed in front of only one witness. Ms. Smith also filed a reconventional and third party demands against Chase, alleging wrongful seizure, conversion, and federal due process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Ultimately, the Banks were found to have improperly seized the Smith home. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether private attorneys for the lender were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground their actions did not violate 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Supreme Court found that the district court properly granted summary judgment, and the court of appeal erred in reversing that judgment. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a bank, filed suit against Respondent seeking the outstanding balance remaining on a loan it made to him in 2012. Rather than litigate the matter, Respondent entered into an “Agreed Order Confessing Judgment” with the Bank for the full amount. The circuit court entered the order and dismissed the matter. Thereafter, the Bank’s vice president, who also arranged Respondent’s loan, pleaded guilty to bank fraud. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the confessed judgment pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that after he learned of the vice president’s conviction, he suspected there were improprieties regarding his loan. The circuit court concluded that relief from judgment was justified, finding that the circumstances surrounding the loan made the loan questionable and that a decision on the merits was favored. Petitioner subsequently filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Respondent’s motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent’s motion to vacate the judgment. View "State ex rel. First State Bank v. Hon. F. Jane Hustead" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lender who takes possession of property but does not become the fee simple record owner of the property through foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is liable for homeowners’ association assessments. The resolution of the question was not addressed on appeal, however. Petitioner, a homeowners association, filed a complaint against Respondent, a bank, alleging that Respondent had failed to pay homeowners’ association dues since taking possession of property. The district court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner’s appeal from the district court to a circuit court was untimely. View "Brownstones at Park Potomac Homeowners Ass’n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Harrises bought tens of thousands of shares in Bancorp through a TD Ameritrade account. Six years later, the Harrises sought to hold some of their Bancorp stock in another form, registered in their name and reflected in a physical copy of a certificate signifying their ownership. TD Ameritrade refused to convert the Harrises’ form of ownership, stating that all Bancorp stock was in a “global lock,” prohibiting activity in the stock, including changing the Harrises’ form of ownership. The lock was created because someone had fraudulently created hundreds of millions of invalid shares of Bancorp stock. The Harrises sued, alleging that TD Ameritrade had violated SEC Rule 15c3-3 and Nebraska’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal.. Neither the SEC Rule nor Nebraska’s Commercial Code creates a private right of action to vindicate the alleged problem. View "Harris v. TD Ameritrade, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs defaulted on their residential mortgage loan, they sought to enjoin BNY from foreclosing by claiming that the assignment of the deed of trust (DOT) to BNY was void. Plaintiffs also filed a false-lien claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002 against BNY and MERS. The district court granted BNY's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BNY’s efforts to foreclose on the ground that MERS’s assignment to BNY was void for violating the PSA. Because plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing BNY’s lien was in fact fraudulent, plaintiffs have failed to state a false lien claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Ferguson v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law